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Keegan Harris

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10 papers

2 author rows

TMLR Journal 2026 Journal Article

Incentive-Aware Synthetic Control: Accurate Counterfactual Estimation via Incentivized Exploration

Dung Daniel Ngo
Keegan Harris
Anish Agarwal
Vasilis Syrgkanis
Steven Wu

Synthetic control methods (SCMs) are a canonical approach used to estimate treatment effects from panel data in the internet economy. We shed light on a frequently overlooked but ubiquitous assumption made in SCMs of ``overlap'': a treated unit can be written as some combination---typically, convex or linear---of the units that remain under control. We show that if units select their own interventions, and there is sufficiently large heterogeneity between units that prefer different interventions, overlap will not hold. We address this issue by proposing a recommender system which incentivizes units with different preferences to take interventions they would not normally consider. Specifically, leveraging tools from information design and online learning, we propose an SCM that incentivizes exploration in panel data settings by providing incentive-compatible intervention recommendations to units. We establish this estimator obtains valid counterfactual estimates without the need for an a priori overlap assumption. We extend our results to the setting of synthetic interventions, where the goal is to produce counterfactual outcomes under all interventions, not just control. Finally, we provide two hypothesis tests for determining whether unit overlap holds for a given panel dataset.

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NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Can large language models explore in-context?

Akshay Krishnamurthy
Keegan Harris
Dylan J. Foster
Cyril Zhang
Aleksandrs Slivkins

We investigate the extent to which contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) can engage in exploration, a core capability in reinforcement learning and decision making. We focus on native performance of existing LLMs, without training interventions. We deploy LLMs as agents in simple multi-armed bandit environments, specifying the environment description and interaction history entirely in-context, i. e. , within the LLM prompt. We experiment with GPT-3. 5, GPT-4, and Llama2, using a variety of prompt designs, and find that the models do not robustly engage in exploration without substantial interventions: i) Only one configuration resulted in satisfactory exploratory behavior: GPT-4 with chain-of-thought reasoning and an externally summarized interaction history; ii) All other configurations did not result in robust exploratory behavior, including those with chain-of-thought reasoning but unsummarized history. While these findings can be interpreted positively, they suggest that external summarization—which may not be possible in more complex settings—is essential for desirable LLM behavior. We conclude that non-trivial algorithmic interventions, such as fine-tuning or dataset curation, may be required to empower LLM-based decision making agents in complex settings.

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NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Regret Minimization in Stackelberg Games with Side Information

Keegan Harris
Zhiwei S. Wu
Maria-Florina Balcan

Algorithms for playing in Stackelberg games have been deployed in real-world domains including airport security, anti-poaching efforts, and cyber-crime prevention. However, these algorithms often fail to take into consideration the additional information available to each player (e. g. traffic patterns, weather conditions, network congestion), a salient feature of reality which may significantly affect both players' optimal strategies. We formalize such settings as Stackelberg games with side information, in which both players observe an external context before playing. The leader commits to a (context-dependent) strategy, and the follower best-responds to both the leader's strategy and the context. We focus on the online setting in which a sequence of followers arrive over time, and the context may change from round-to-round. In sharp contrast to the non-contextual version, we show that it is impossible for the leader to achieve good performance (measured by regret) in the full adversarial setting. Motivated by our impossibility result, we show that no-regret learning is possible in two natural relaxations: the setting in which the sequence of followers is chosen stochastically and the sequence of contexts is adversarial, and the setting in which the sequence of contexts is stochastic and the sequence of followers is chosen by an adversary.

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NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Adaptive Principal Component Regression with Applications to Panel Data

Anish Agarwal
Keegan Harris
Justin Whitehouse
Steven Z. Wu

Principal component regression (PCR) is a popular technique for fixed-design error-in-variables regression, a generalization of the linear regression setting in which the observed covariates are corrupted with random noise. We provide the first time-uniform finite sample guarantees for online (regularized) PCR whenever data is collected adaptively. Since the proof techniques for PCR in the fixed design setting do not readily extend to the online setting, our results rely on adapting tools from modern martingale concentration to the error-in-variables setting. As an application of our bounds, we provide a framework for counterfactual estimation of unit-specific treatment effects in panel data settings when interventions are assigned adaptively. Our framework may be thought of as a generalization of the synthetic interventions framework where data is collected via an adaptive intervention assignment policy.

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NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Meta-Learning Adversarial Bandit Algorithms

Misha Khodak
Ilya Osadchiy
Keegan Harris
Maria-Florina F. Balcan
Kfir Y. Levy
Ron Meir
Steven Z. Wu

We study online meta-learning with bandit feedback, with the goal of improving performance across multiple tasks if they are similar according to some natural similarity measure. As the first to target the adversarial online-within-online partial-information setting, we design meta-algorithms that combine outer learners to simultaneously tune the initialization and other hyperparameters of an inner learner for two important cases: multi-armed bandits (MAB) and bandit linear optimization (BLO). For MAB, the meta-learners initialize and set hyperparameters of the Tsallis-entropy generalization of Exp3, with the task-averaged regret improving if the entropy of the optima-in-hindsight is small. For BLO, we learn to initialize and tune online mirror descent (OMD) with self-concordant barrier regularizers, showing that task-averaged regret varies directly with an action space-dependent measure they induce. Our guarantees rely on proving that unregularized follow-the-leader combined with two levels of low-dimensional hyperparameter tuning is enough to learn a sequence of affine functions of non-Lipschitz and sometimes non-convex Bregman divergences bounding the regret of OMD.

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ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Meta-Learning in Games

Keegan Harris
Ioannis Anagnostides
Gabriele Farina
Mikhail Khodak
Zhiwei Steven Wu
Tuomas Sandholm

In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions—ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions—evolve dynamically, thereby leading to many similar games to be solved. To address this gap, we introduce meta-learning for equilibrium finding and learning to play games. We establish the first meta-learning guarantees for a variety of fundamental and well-studied games, including two-player zero-sum games, general-sum games, Stackelberg games, and multiple extensions thereof. In particular, we obtain rates of convergence to different game-theoretic equilibria that depend on natural notions of similarity between the sequence of games encountered, while at the same time recovering the known single-game guarantees when the sequence of games is arbitrary. Along the way, we prove a number of new results in the single-game regime through a simple and unified framework, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we evaluate our meta-learning algorithms on endgames faced by the poker agent Libratus against top human professionals. The experiments show that games with varying stack sizes can be solved significantly faster using our meta-learning techniques than by solving them separately, often by an order of magnitude.

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NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Strategic Apple Tasting

Keegan Harris
Chara Podimata
Steven Z. Wu

Algorithmic decision-making in high-stakes domains often involves assigning decisions to agents with incentives to strategically modify their input to the algorithm. In addition to dealing with incentives, in many domains of interest (e. g. lending and hiring) the decision-maker only observes feedback regarding their policy for rounds in which they assign a positive decision to the agent; this type of feedback is often referred to as apple tasting (or one-sided) feedback. We formalize this setting as an online learning problem with apple-tasting feedback where a principal makes decisions about a sequence of $T$ agents, each of which is represented by a context that may be strategically modified. Our goal is to achieve sublinear strategic regret, which compares the performance of the principal to that of the best fixed policy in hindsight, if the agents were truthful when revealing their contexts. Our main result is a learning algorithm which incurs $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ strategic regret when the sequence of agents is chosen stochastically. We also give an algorithm capable of handling adversarially-chosen agents, albeit at the cost of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{(d+1)/(d+2)})$ strategic regret (where $d$ is the dimension of the context). Our algorithms can be easily adapted to the setting where the principal receives bandit feedback---this setting generalizes both the linear contextual bandit problem (by considering agents with incentives) and the strategic classification problem (by allowing for partial feedback).

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NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse

Keegan Harris
Valerie Chen
Joon Kim
Ameet Talwalkar
Hoda Heidari
Steven Z. Wu

When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them to modify their features in desirable ways. We show that when using persuasion, the decision maker and decision subject are never worse off in expectation, while the decision maker can be significantly better off. While the decision maker’s problem of finding the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) signaling policy takes the form of optimization over infinitely many variables, we show that this optimization can be cast as a linear program over finitely-many regions of the space of possible assessment rules. While this reformulation simplifies the problem dramatically, solving the linear program requires reasoning about exponentially-many variables, even in relatively simple cases. Motivated by this observation, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme that recovers a near-optimal signaling policy. Finally, our numerical simulations on semi-synthetic data empirically demonstrate the benefits of using persuasion in the algorithmic recourse setting.

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ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Strategic Instrumental Variable Regression: Recovering Causal Relationships From Strategic Responses

Keegan Harris
Dung Daniel T. Ngo
Logan Stapleton
Hoda Heidari
Zhiwei Steven Wu

In settings where Machine Learning (ML) algorithms automate or inform consequential decisions about people, individual decision subjects are often incentivized to strategically modify their observable attributes to receive more favorable predictions. As a result, the distribution the assessment rule is trained on may differ from the one it operates on in deployment. While such distribution shifts, in general, can hinder accurate predictions, our work identifies a unique opportunity associated with shifts due to strategic responses: We show that we can use strategic responses effectively to recover causal relationships between the observable features and outcomes we wish to predict, even under the presence of unobserved confounding variables. Specifically, our work establishes a novel connection between strategic responses to ML models and instrumental variable (IV) regression by observing that the sequence of deployed models can be viewed as an instrument that affects agents’ observable features but does not directly influence their outcomes. We show that our causal recovery method can be utilized to improve decision-making across several important criteria: individual fairness, agent outcomes, and predictive risk. In particular, we show that if decision subjects differ in their ability to modify non-causal attributes, any decision rule deviating from the causal coefficients can lead to (potentially unbounded) individual-level unfairness. .

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NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Stateful Strategic Regression

Keegan Harris
Hoda Heidari
Steven Z. Wu

Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable assessments. While prior work has focused on the short-term strategic interactions between a decision-making institution (modeled as a principal) and individual decision-subjects (modeled as agents), we investigate interactions spanning multiple time-steps. In particular, we consider settings in which the agent's effort investment today can accumulate over time in the form of an internal state - impacting both his future rewards and that of the principal. We characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium of the resulting game and provide novel algorithms for computing it. Our analysis reveals several intriguing insights about the role of multiple interactions in shaping the game's outcome: First, we establish that in our stateful setting, the class of all linear assessment policies remains as powerful as the larger class of all monotonic assessment policies. While recovering the principal's optimal policy requires solving a non-convex optimization problem, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for recovering both the principal and agent's optimal policies under common assumptions about the process by which effort investments convert to observable features. Most importantly, we show that with multiple rounds of interaction at her disposal, the principal is more effective at incentivizing the agent to accumulate effort in her desired direction. Our work addresses several critical gaps in the growing literature on the societal impacts of automated decision-making - by focusing on longer time horizons and accounting for the compounding nature of decisions individuals receive over time.

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