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Kangjie Chen

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12 papers
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12

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Analogy-based Multi-Turn Jailbreak against Large Language Models

  • Mengjie Wu
  • Yihao Huang
  • Zhenjun Lin
  • Kangjie Chen
  • Yuyang Zhang
  • Yuhan Huang
  • Run Wang
  • Lina Wang

Large language models (LLMs) are inherently designed to support multi-turn interactions, which opens up new possibilities for jailbreak attacks that unfold gradually and potentially bypass safety mechanisms more effectively than single-turn attacks. However, current multi-turn jailbreak methods are still in their early stages and suffer from two key limitations. First, they all inherently require inserting sensitive phrases into the context, which makes the dialogue appear suspicious and increases the likelihood of rejection, undermining the effectiveness of the attack. Second, even when harmful content is generated, the response often fails to align with the malicious prompt due to semantic drift, where the conversation slowly moves away from its intended goal. To address these challenges, we propose an analogy-based black-box multi-turn jailbreak framework that constructs fully benign contexts to improve attack success rate while ensuring semantic alignment with the malicious intent. The method first guides the model through safe tasks that mirror the response structure of the malicious prompt, enabling it to internalize the format without exposure to sensitive content. A controlled semantic shift is then introduced in the final turn, substituting benign elements with malicious ones while preserving structural coherence. Experiments on six commercial and open-source LLMs, two benchmark datasets show that our method significantly improves attack performance, achieving an average attack success rate of 93. 3\% and outperforming five competitive baselines. Our code is released at https: //github. com/MM-WW55/AMA

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Quantifying and Alleviating Co-Adaptation in Sparse-View 3D Gaussian Splatting

  • Kangjie Chen
  • Yingji Zhong
  • Zhihao Li
  • Jiaqi Lin
  • Youyu Chen
  • Minghan Qin
  • Haoqian Wang

3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has demonstrated impressive performance in novel view synthesis under dense-view settings. However, in sparse-view scenarios, despite the realistic renderings in training views, 3DGS occasionally manifests appearance artifacts in novel views. This paper investigates the appearance artifacts in sparse-view 3DGS and uncovers a core limitation of current approaches: the optimized Gaussians are overly-entangled with one another to aggressively fit the training views, which leads to a neglect of the real appearance distribution of the underlying scene and results in appearance artifacts in novel views. The analysis is based on a proposed metric, termed Co-Adaptation Score (CA), which quantifies the entanglement among Gaussians, i. e. , co-adaptation, by computing the pixel-wise variance across multiple renderings of the same viewpoint, with different random subsets of Gaussians. The analysis reveals that the degree of co-adaptation is naturally alleviated as the number of training views increases. Based on the analysis, we propose two lightweight strategies to explicitly mitigate the co-adaptation in sparse-view 3DGS: (1) random gaussian dropout; (2) multiplicative noise injection to the opacity. Both strategies are designed to be plug-and-play, and their effectiveness is validated across various methods and benchmarks. We hope that our insights into the co-adaptation effect will inspire the community to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of sparse-view 3DGS.

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Transstratal Adversarial Attack: Compromising Multi-Layered Defenses in Text-to-Image Models

  • Chunlong Xie
  • Kangjie Chen
  • Shangwei Guo
  • Shudong Zhang
  • Tianwei Zhang
  • Tao Xiang

Modern Text-to-Image (T2I) models deploy multi-layered defenses to block Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content generation. These defenses typically include sequential layers such as prompt filters, concept erasers and image filters. While existing adversarial attacks have demonstrated vulnerabilities in isolated defense layers, they prove largely ineffective against multi-layered defenses deployed in real-world T2I systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that exploiting overlapping vulnerabilities across these distinct defense layers enables adversaries to systematically bypass the entire safeguard of T2I systems. We propose Transstratal Adversarial Attack (TAA), a novel black-box framework to compromise T2I models with multi-layered protection. It generates transstratal adversarial prompts to evade all defense layers simultaneously. This is accomplished through transstratal adversarial candidate generation using LLMs to fulfill implicit and subjective adversarial requirements against different defense layers, combined with adversarial genetic optimization for efficient black-box search to maximize the bypass rates and generated image harmfulness. Evaluated across 14 T2I models (e. g. , Stable Diffusion, DALL·E, and Midjourney) and 17 safety modules, our attack achieves an average attack success rate of 85. 6\%, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by 73. 5\%. Our findings challenge the isolated design of safety mechanisms and establish the first benchmark for holistic robustness evaluation in multi-layered safeguarded T2I models. The code can be found in https: //github. com/Bluedask/TAA-T2I.

ICML Conference 2025 Conference Paper

TRUST-VLM: Thorough Red-Teaming for Uncovering Safety Threats in Vision-Language Models

  • Kangjie Chen
  • Muyang Li
  • Guanlin Li
  • Shudong Zhang
  • Shangwei Guo
  • Tianwei Zhang 0004

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have become a cornerstone in multi-modal artificial intelligence, enabling seamless integration of visual and textual information for tasks such as image captioning, visual question answering, and cross-modal retrieval. Despite their impressive capabilities, these models often exhibit inherent vulnerabilities that can lead to safety failures in critical applications. Red-teaming is an important approach to identify and test system’s vulnerabilities, but how to conduct red-teaming for contemporary VLMs is an unexplored area. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-modal red-teaming approach, TRUST-VLM, to enhance both the attack success rate and the diversity of successful test cases for VLMs. Specifically, TRUST-VLM is built upon the in-context learning to adversarially test a VLM on both image and text inputs. Furthermore, we involve feedback from the target VLM to improve the efficiency of test case generation. Extensive experiments show that TRUST-VLM not only outperforms traditional red-teaming techniques in generating diverse and effective adversarial cases but also provides actionable insights for model improvement. These findings highlight the importance of advanced red-teaming strategies in ensuring the reliability of VLMs.

NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

ART: Automatic Red-teaming for Text-to-Image Models to Protect Benign Users

  • Guanlin Li
  • Kangjie Chen
  • Shudong Zhang
  • Jie Zhang
  • Tianwei Zhang

Large-scale pre-trained generative models are taking the world by storm, due to their abilities in generating creative content. Meanwhile, safeguards for these generative models are developed, to protect users' rights and safety, most of which are designed for large language models. Existing methods primarily focus on jailbreak and adversarial attacks, which mainly evaluate the model's safety under malicious prompts. Recent work found that manually crafted safe prompts can unintentionally trigger unsafe generations. To further systematically evaluate the safety risks of text-to-image models, we propose a novel Automatic Red-Teaming framework, ART. Our method leverages both vision language model and large language model to establish a connection between unsafe generations and their prompts, thereby more efficiently identifying the model's vulnerabilities. With our comprehensive experiments, we reveal the toxicity of the popular open-source text-to-image models. The experiments also validate the effectiveness, adaptability, and great diversity of ART. Additionally, we introduce three large-scale red-teaming datasets for studying the safety risks associated with text-to-image models. Datasets and models can be found in https: //github. com/GuanlinLee/ART.

ICLR Conference 2024 Conference Paper

BadEdit: Backdooring Large Language Models by Model Editing

  • Yanzhou Li
  • Tianlin Li
  • Kangjie Chen
  • Jian Zhang 0087
  • Shangqing Liu
  • Wenhan Wang
  • Tianwei Zhang 0004
  • Yang Liu 0003

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Clean-image Backdoor: Attacking Multi-label Models with Poisoned Labels Only

  • Kangjie Chen
  • Xiaoxuan Lou
  • Guowen Xu
  • Jiwei Li 0001
  • Tianwei Zhang 0004

Multi-label models have been widely used in various applications including image annotation and object detection. The fly in the ointment is its inherent vulnerability to backdoor attacks due to the adoption of deep learning techniques. However, all existing backdoor attacks exclusively require to modify training inputs (e.g., images), which may be impractical in real-world applications. In this paper, we aim to break this wall and propose the first clean-image backdoor attack, which only poisons the training labels without touching the training samples. Our key insight is that in a multi-label learning task, the adversary can just manipulate the annotations of training samples consisting of a specific set of classes to activate the backdoor. We design a novel trigger exploration method to find convert and effective triggers to enhance the attack performance. We also propose three target label selection strategies to achieve different goals. Experimental results indicate that our clean-image backdoor can achieve a 98% attack success rate while preserving the model's functionality on the benign inputs. Besides, the proposed clean-image backdoor can evade existing state-of-the-art defenses.

ICML Conference 2023 Conference Paper

GuardHFL: Privacy Guardian for Heterogeneous Federated Learning

  • Hanxiao Chen 0001
  • Meng Hao 0001
  • Hongwei Li 0001
  • Kangjie Chen
  • Guowen Xu
  • Tianwei Zhang 0004
  • Xilin Zhang

Heterogeneous federated learning (HFL) enables clients with different computation and communication capabilities to collaboratively train their own customized models via a query-response paradigm on auxiliary datasets. However, such a paradigm raises serious privacy concerns due to the leakage of highly sensitive query samples and response predictions. We put forth GuardHFL, the first-of-its-kind efficient and privacy-preserving HFL framework. GuardHFL is equipped with a novel HFL-friendly secure querying scheme built on lightweight secret sharing and symmetric-key techniques. The core of GuardHFL is two customized multiplication and comparison protocols, which substantially boost the execution efficiency. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that GuardHFL significantly outperforms the alternative instantiations based on existing state-of-the-art techniques in both runtime and communication cost.

ICLR Conference 2022 Conference Paper

BadPre: Task-agnostic Backdoor Attacks to Pre-trained NLP Foundation Models

  • Kangjie Chen
  • Yuxian Meng
  • Xiaofei Sun 0001
  • Shangwei Guo
  • Tianwei Zhang 0004
  • Jiwei Li 0001
  • Chun Fan 0001

Pre-trained Natural Language Processing (NLP) models, which can be adapted to a variety of downstream language tasks via fine-tuning, highly accelerate the learning progress of NLP models. However, NLP models have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Previous NLP backdoor attacks mainly focus on one specific task. This limitation makes existing solutions less applicable to different NLP models which have been widely used in various tasks. In this work, we propose BadPre, the first backdoor attack against various downstream models built based on pre-trained NLP models. BadPre can launch trojan attacks against different language tasks with the same trigger. The key insight of our approach is that downstream models can inherit the security characteristics from the pre-trained models. Specifically, we leverage data posing to the pre-trained NLP models and then inference the downstream models with sentences embedded triggers. Furthermore, to fool backdoor detectors, we design a novel adversarial attack method to generate a more robust trigger. Experimental results indicate that our approach can effectively attack a wide range of downstream NLP tasks and exhibit significant robustness against backdoor detectors.

AAMAS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Temporal Watermarks for Deep Reinforcement Learning Models

  • Kangjie Chen
  • Shangwei Guo
  • Tianwei Zhang
  • Shuxin Li
  • Yang Liu

Watermarking has become a popular and attractive technique to protect the Intellectual Property (IP) of Deep Learning (DL) models. However, very few studies explore the possibility of watermarking Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) models. Common approaches in the DL context embed backdoors into the protected model and use special samples to verify the model ownership. These solutions are easy to be detected, and can potentially affect the performance and behaviors of the target model. Such limitations make existing solutions less applicable to safety- and security-critical tasks and scenarios, where DRL has been widely used. In this work, we propose a novel watermarking scheme for DRL protection. Instead of using spatial watermarks as in DL models, we introduce temporal watermarks, which can reduce the potential impact and damage to the target model, while achieving ownership verification with high fidelity. Specifically, (1) we design a new damage metric to select sequential states for watermark generation; (2) we introduce a new reward function to efficiently alter the model’s behaviors for watermark embedding; (3) we propose to utilize a predefined probability density function of actions over the watermark states as the verification evidence. Our method is general and can be applied to various DRL tasks with either deterministic or stochastic reinforcement learning algorithms. Extensive experimental results show that it can effectively preserve the functionality of DRL models and exhibit significant robustness against common model modifications, e. g. , fine-tuning and model compression.

AAAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Stealthy and Efficient Adversarial Attacks against Deep Reinforcement Learning

  • Jianwen Sun
  • Tianwei Zhang
  • Xiaofei Xie
  • Lei Ma
  • Yan Zheng
  • Kangjie Chen
  • Yang Liu

Adversarial attacks against conventional Deep Learning (DL) systems and algorithms have been widely studied, and various defenses were proposed. However, the possibility and feasibility of such attacks against Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) are less explored. As DRL has achieved great success in various complex tasks, designing effective adversarial attacks is an indispensable prerequisite towards building robust DRL algorithms. In this paper, we introduce two novel adversarial attack techniques to stealthily and efficiently attack the DRL agents. These two techniques enable an adversary to inject adversarial samples in a minimal set of critical moments while causing the most severe damage to the agent. The first technique is the critical point attack: the adversary builds a model to predict the future environmental states and agent’s actions, assesses the damage of each possible attack strategy, and selects the optimal one. The second technique is the antagonist attack: the adversary automatically learns a domainagnostic model to discover the critical moments of attacking the agent in an episode. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques. Specifically, to successfully attack the DRL agent, our critical point technique only requires 1 (TORCS) or 2 (Atari Pong and Breakout) steps, and the antagonist technique needs fewer than 5 steps (4 Mujoco tasks), which are significant improvements over state-of-theart methods.

IJCAI Conference 2017 Conference Paper

Defending Against Man-In-The-Middle Attack in Repeated Games

  • Shuxin Li
  • Xiaohong Li
  • Jianye Hao
  • Bo An
  • Zhiyong Feng
  • Kangjie Chen
  • Chengwei Zhang

The Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack has become widespread in networks nowadays. The MITM attack would cause serious information leakage and result in tremendous loss to users. Previous work applies game theory to analyze the MITM attack-defense problem and computes the optimal defense strategy to minimize the total loss. It assumes that all defenders are cooperative and the attacker know defenders' strategies beforehand. However, each individual defender is rational and may not have the incentive to cooperate. Furthermore, the attacker can hardly know defenders' strategies ahead of schedule in practice. To this end, we assume that all defenders are self-interested and model the MITM attack-defense scenario as a simultaneous-move game. Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept which is proved to be always unique. Given the impracticability of computing Nash equilibrium directly, we propose practical adaptive algorithms for the defenders and the attacker to learn towards the unique Nash equilibrium through repeated interactions. Simulation results show that the algorithms are able to converge to Nash equilibrium strategy efficiently.

v2026.09.13