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Juba Ziani

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8 papers

2 author rows

AAAI Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Fairness Issues and Mitigations in (Differentially Private) Socio-Demographic Data Processes

Joonhyuk Ko
Juba Ziani
Saswat Das
Matt Williams
Ferdinando Fioretto

Statistical agencies rely on sampling techniques to collect socio-demographic data crucial for policy-making and resource allocation. This paper shows that surveys of important societal relevance introduce sampling errors that unevenly impact group-level estimates, thereby compromising fairness in downstream decisions. To address these issues, this paper introduces an optimization approach modeled on real-world survey design processes, ensuring sampling costs are optimized while maintaining error margins within prescribed tolerances. Additionally, privacy-preserving methods used to determine sampling rates can further impact these fairness issues. This paper explores the impact of differential privacy on the statistics informing the sampling process, revealing a surprising effect: not only is the expected negative effect from the addition of noise for differential privacy negligible, but also this privacy noise can in fact reduce unfairness as it positively biases smaller counts. These findings are validated over an extensive analysis using datasets commonly applied in census statistics.

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NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Incentivizing Desirable Effort Profiles in Strategic Classification: The Role of Causality and Uncertainty

Valia Efthymiou
Chara Podimata
Diptangshu Sen
Juba Ziani

We study strategic classification in binary decision-making settings where agents can modify their features in order to improve their classification outcomes. Importantly, our work considers the causal structure across different features, acknowledging that effort in one feature may affect other features. The main goal of our work is to understand when and how much agent effort is invested towards desirable features, and how this is influenced by the deployed classifier, the causal structure of the agent's features, their ability to modify them, and the information available to the agent about the classifier and the feature causal graph. We characterize conditions under which agents with full information about the causal structure and the principal's classifier align with the principal's goals of incentivizing effort mostly in ``desirable'' features, and identify cases where designing such classifiers (from the principal's side) is still tractable despite general non-convexity. Under incomplete information, we show that uncertainty leads agents to prioritize features with high expected impact and low variance, which may often be misaligned with the principal's goals. Finally, using numerical experiments based on a cardiovascular disease risk study, we illustrate how to incentivize desirable modifications even under uncertainty.

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TMLR Journal 2025 Journal Article

Producers Equilibria and Dynamics in Engagement-Driven Recommender Systems

Krishna Acharya
Varun Vangala
Jingyan Wang
Juba Ziani

Online platforms such as YouTube, Instagram heavily rely on recommender systems to decide what content to present to users. Producers, in turn, often create content that is likely to be recommended to users and have users engage with it. To do so, producers try to align their content with the preferences of their targeted user base. In this work, we explore the equilibrium behavior of producers who are interested in maximizing user engagement. We study two variants of the content-serving rule for the platform's recommender system, and provide a structural characterization of producer behavior at equilibrium: namely, each producer chooses to focus on a single embedded feature. We further show that specialization, defined as different producers optimizing for distinct types of content, naturally emerges from the competition among producers trying to maximize user engagement. We provide a heuristic for computing equilibria of our engagement game, and evaluate it experimentally. We highlight i) the performance and convergence of our heuristic, ii) the degree of producer specialization, and iii) the impact of the content-serving rule on producer and user utilities at equilibrium and provide guidance on how to set the content-serving rule.

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NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Bayesian Strategic Classification

Lee Cohen
Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi
Kevin Stang1
Ali Vakilian
Juba Ziani

In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to obtain a positive classification outcome from the learner’s classifier, typically assuming agents have full knowledge of the deployed classifier. In contrast, we consider a Bayesian setting where agents have a common distributional prior on the classifier being used and agents manipulate their features to maximize their expected utility according to this prior. The learner can reveal truthful, yet not necessarily complete, information about the classifier to the agents, aiming to release just enough information to shape the agents' behavior and thus maximize accuracy. We show that partial information release can counter-intuitively benefit the learner’s accuracy, allowing qualified agents to pass the classifier while preventing unqualified agents from doing so. Despite the intractability of computing the best response of an agent in the general case, we provide oracle-efficient algorithms for scenarios where the learner’s hypothesis class consists of low-dimensional linear classifiers or when the agents’ cost function satisfies a sub-modularity condition. Additionally, we address the learner’s optimization problem, offering both positive and negative results on determining the optimal information release to maximize expected accuracy, particularly in settings where an agent’s qualification can be represented by a real-valued number.

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ICLR Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Oracle Efficient Algorithms for Groupwise Regret

Krishna Acharya
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran
Sampath Kannan
Aaron Roth 0001
Juba Ziani

We study the problem of online prediction, in which at each time step $t \in \{1,2, \cdots T\}$, an individual $x_t$ arrives, whose label we must predict. Each individual is associated with various groups, defined based on their features such as age, sex, race etc., which may intersect. Our goal is to make predictions that have regret guarantees not just overall but also simultaneously on each sub-sequence comprised of the members of any single group. Previous work such as [Blum & Lykouris][1] and [Lee et al][2] provide attractive regret guarantees for these problems; however, these are computationally intractable on large model classes (e.g., the set of all linear models, as used in linear regression). We show that a simple modification of the sleeping experts technique of [Blum & Lykouris][1] yields an efficient *reduction* to the well-understood problem of obtaining diminishing external regret *absent group considerations*. Our approach gives similar regret guarantees compared to [Blum & Lykouris][1]; however, we run in time linear in the number of groups, and are oracle-efficient in the hypothesis class. This in particular implies that our algorithm is efficient whenever the number of groups is polynomially bounded and the external-regret problem can be solved efficiently, an improvement on [Blum & Lykouris][1]'s stronger condition that the model class must be small. Our approach can handle online linear regression and online combinatorial optimization problems like online shortest paths. Beyond providing theoretical regret bounds, we evaluate this algorithm with an extensive set of experiments on synthetic data and on two real data sets --- Medical costs and the Adult income dataset, both instantiated with intersecting groups defined in terms of race, sex, and other demographic characteristics. We find that uniformly across groups, our algorithm gives substantial error improvements compared to running a standard online linear regression algorithm with no groupwise regret guarantees.

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ICML Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Sequential Strategic Screening

Lee Cohen 0001
Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi
Kevin Stangl
Ali Vakilian
Juba Ziani

We initiate the study of strategic behavior in screening processes with multiple classifiers. We focus on two contrasting settings: a "conjunctive” setting in which an individual must satisfy all classifiers simultaneously, and a sequential setting in which an individual to succeed must satisfy classifiers one at a time. In other words, we introduce the combination of strategic classificationwith screening processes. We show that sequential screening pipelines exhibit new and surprising behavior where individuals can exploit the sequential ordering of the tests to "zig-zag” between classifiers without having to simultaneously satisfy all of them. We demonstrate an individual can obtain a positive outcome using a limited manipulation budget even when far from the intersection of the positive regions of every classifier. Finally, we consider a learner whose goal is to design a sequential screening process that is robust to such manipulations, and provide a construction for the learner that optimizes a natural objective.

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ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Information Discrepancy in Strategic Learning

Yahav Bechavod
Chara Podimata
Zhiwei Steven Wu
Juba Ziani

We initiate the study of the effects of non-transparency in decision rules on individuals’ ability to improve in strategic learning settings. Inspired by real-life settings, such as loan approvals and college admissions, we remove the assumption typically made in the strategic learning literature, that the decision rule is fully known to individuals, and focus instead on settings where it is inaccessible. In their lack of knowledge, individuals try to infer this rule by learning from their peers (e. g. , friends and acquaintances who previously applied for a loan), naturally forming groups in the population, each with possibly different type and level of information regarding the decision rule. We show that, in equilibrium, the principal’s decision rule optimizing welfare across sub-populations may cause a strong negative externality: the true quality of some of the groups can actually deteriorate. On the positive side, we show that, in many natural cases, optimal improvement can be guaranteed simultaneously for all sub-populations. We further introduce a measure we term information overlap proxy, and demonstrate its usefulness in characterizing the disparity in improvements across sub-populations. Finally, we identify a natural condition under which improvement can be guaranteed for all sub-populations while maintaining high predictive accuracy. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments on real-world datasets.

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AAAI Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Non-Exploitable Protocols for Repeated Cake Cutting

Omer Tamuz
Shai Vardi
Juba Ziani

We introduce the notion of exploitability in cut-and-choose protocols for repeated cake cutting. If a cut-and-choose protocol is repeated, the cutter can possibly gain information about the chooser from her previous actions, and exploit this information for her own gain, at the expense of the chooser. We de- ﬁne a generalization of cut-and-choose protocols—forced-cut protocols—in which some cuts are made exogenously while others are made by the cutter, and show that there exist nonexploitable forced-cut protocols that use a small number of cuts per day: When the cake has at least as many dimensions as days, we show a protocol that uses a single cut per day. When the cake is 1-dimensional, we show an adaptive non-exploitable protocol that uses 3 cuts per day, and a nonadaptive protocol that uses n cuts per day (where n is the number of days). In contrast, we show that no non-adaptive non-exploitable forced-cut protocol can use a constant number of cuts per day. Finally, we show that if the cake is at least 2-dimensional, there is a non-adaptive non-exploitable protocol that uses 3 cuts per day.

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