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Jeremiah Blocki

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

6 papers
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Possible papers

6

I&C Journal 2024 Journal Article

Cost-asymmetric memory hard password hashing

  • Wenjie Bai
  • Jeremiah Blocki
  • Mohammad Hassan Ameri

In the past decade billions of user passwords have been exposed to the dangerous threat of offline password cracking attacks. An offline attacker who has stolen the cryptographic hash of a user's password can check as many password guesses as s/he likes limited only by the resources that s/he is willing to invest to crack the password. Pepper and key-stretching are two techniques that have been proposed to deter an offline attacker by increasing guessing costs. Pepper ensures that the cost of rejecting an incorrect password guess is higher than the (expected) cost of verifying a correct password guess. This is useful because most of the offline attacker's guesses will be incorrect. Unfortunately, as we observe the traditional peppering defense seems to be incompatible with modern memory hard key-stretching algorithms such as Argon2 or Scrypt. We introduce an alternative to pepper which we call Cost-Asymmetric Memory Hard Password Authentication which benefits from the same cost-asymmetry as the classical peppering defense i. e. , the cost of rejecting an incorrect password guess is larger than the expected cost to authenticate a correct password guess. When configured properly we prove that our mechanism can only reduce the percentage of user passwords that are cracked by a rational offline attacker whose goal is to maximize (expected) profit i. e. , the total value of cracked passwords minus the total guessing costs. We evaluate the effectiveness of our mechanism on empirical password datasets against a rational offline attacker. Our empirical analysis shows that our mechanism can reduce the percentage of user passwords that are cracked by a rational attacker by up to 10%.

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Differentially Private $L_2$-Heavy Hitters in the Sliding Window Model

  • Jeremiah Blocki
  • Seunghoon Lee 0004
  • Tamalika Mukherjee
  • Samson Zhou

The data management of large companies often prioritize more recent data, as a source of higher accuracy prediction than outdated data. For example, the Facebook data policy retains user search histories for $6$ months while the Google data retention policy states that browser information may be stored for up to $9$ months. These policies are captured by the sliding window model, in which only the most recent $W$ statistics form the underlying dataset. In this paper, we consider the problem of privately releasing the $L_2$-heavy hitters in the sliding window model, which include $L_p$-heavy hitters for $p\le 2$ and in some sense are the strongest possible guarantees that can be achieved using polylogarithmic space, but cannot be handled by existing techniques due to the sub-additivity of the $L_2$ norm. Moreover, existing non-private sliding window algorithms use the smooth histogram framework, which has high sensitivity. To overcome these barriers, we introduce the first differentially private algorithm for $L_2$-heavy hitters in the sliding window model by initiating a number of $L_2$-heavy hitter algorithms across the stream with significantly lower threshold. Similarly, we augment the algorithms with an approximate frequency tracking algorithm with significantly higher accuracy. We then use smooth sensitivity and statistical distance arguments to show that we can add noise proportional to an estimation of the $L_2$ norm. To the best of our knowledge, our techniques are the first to privately release statistics that are related to a sub-additive function in the sliding window model, and may be of independent interest to future differentially private algorithmic design in the sliding window model.

FOCS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Exponential Lower Bounds for Locally Decodable and Correctable Codes for Insertions and Deletions

  • Jeremiah Blocki
  • Kuan Cheng
  • Elena Grigorescu
  • Xin Li 0006
  • Yu Zheng 0014
  • Minshen Zhu

Locally Decodable Codes (LDCs) are error-correcting codes for which individual message symbols can be quickly recovered despite errors in the codeword. LDCs for Hamming errors have been studied extensively in the past few decades, where a major goal is to understand the amount of redundancy that is necessary and sufficient to decode from large amounts of error, with small query complexity. Despite exciting progress, we still don't have satisfactory answers in several important parameter regimes. For example, in the case of 3-query LDCs, the gap between existing constructions and lower bounds is superpolynomial in the message length. In this work we study LDCs for insertion and deletion errors, called Insdel LDCs. Their study was initiated by Ostrovsky and Paskin-Cherniavsky (Information Theoretic Security, 2015), who gave a reduction from Hamming LDCs to Insdel LDCs with a small blowup in the code parameters. On the other hand, the only known lower bounds for Insdel LDCs come from those for Hamming LDCs, thus there is no separation between them. Here we prove new, strong lower bounds for the existence of Insdel LDCs. In particular, we show that 2-query linear Insdel LDCs do not exist, and give an exponential lower bound for the length of all q-query Insdel LDCs with constant q. For $q$ ≥ 3 our bounds are exponential in the existing lower bounds for Hamming LDCs. Furthermore, our exponential lower bounds continue to hold for adaptive decoders, and even in private-key settings where the encoder and decoder share secret randomness. This exhibits a strict separation between Hamming LDCs and Insdel LDCs. Our strong lower bounds also hold for the related notion of Insdel LCCs (except in the private-key setting), due to an analogue to the Insdel notions of a reduction from Hamming LCCs to LDCs. Our techniques are based on a delicate design and analysis of hard distributions of insertion and deletion errors, which depart significantly from typical techniques used in analyzing Hamming LDCs.

AAAI Conference 2015 Conference Paper

Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

  • Jeremiah Blocki
  • Nicolas Christin
  • Anupam Datta
  • Ariel Procaccia
  • Arunesh Sinha

Modern organizations (e. g. , hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.

IJCAI Conference 2013 Conference Paper

Audit Games

  • Jeremiah Blocki
  • Nicolas Christin
  • Anupam Datta
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Arunesh Sinha

Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e. g. , hospitals, banks) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that efficiently computes the solution.

FOCS Conference 2012 Conference Paper

The Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform Itself Preserves Differential Privacy

  • Jeremiah Blocki
  • Avrim Blum
  • Anupam Datta
  • Or Sheffet

This paper proves that an "old dog", namely - the classical Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform, "performs new tricks" - it gives a novel way of preserving differential privacy. We show that if we take two databases, D and D', such that (i) D'-D is a rank-1 matrix of bounded norm and (ii) all singular values of D and D' are sufficiently large, then multiplying either D or D' with a vector of iid normal Gaussians yields two statistically close distributions in the sense of differential privacy. Furthermore, a small, deterministic and public alteration of the input is enough to assert that all singular values of D are large. We apply the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform to the task of approximating cut-queries: the number of edges crossing a (S, S)-cut in a graph. We show that the JL transform allows us to publish a sanitized graph that preserves edge differential privacy (where two graphs are neighbors if they differ on a single edge) while adding only O(|S|ϵ) random noise to any given query (w. h. p). Comparing the additive noise of our algorithm to existing algorithms for answering cut-queries in a differentially private manner, we outperform all others on small cuts (|S| = o(n)). We also apply our technique to the task of estimating the variance of a given matrix in any given direction. The JL transform allows us to publish a sanitized covariance matrix that preserves differential privacy w. r. t bounded changes (each row in the matrix can change by at most a norm-1 vector) while adding random noise of magnitude independent of the size of the matrix (w. h. p). In contrast, existing algorithms introduce an error which depends on the matrix dimensions.

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