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Hoeteck Wee

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7 papers
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7

FOCS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

ABE for Circuits with poly (λ) -sized Keys from LWE

  • Valerio Cini
  • Hoeteck Wee

We present a key-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme for circuits based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption whose key size is independent of the circuit depth. Our result constitutes the first improvement for ABE for circuits from LWE in almost a decade, given by Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan, and Wee (STOC 2013) and Boneh, et al. (EUROCRYPT 2014) – we reduce the key size in the latter from poly(depth $, \lambda)$ to poly $(\lambda)$. The starting point of our construction is a recent ABE scheme of Li, Lin, and Luo (TCC 2022), which achieves poly $(\lambda)$ key size but requires pairings and generic bilinear groups in addition to LWE; we introduce new lattice techniques to eliminate the additional requirements.

FOCS Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Laconic Function Evaluation and Applications

  • Willy Quach
  • Hoeteck Wee
  • Daniel Wichs

We introduce a new cryptographic primitive called laconic function evaluation (LFE). Using LFE, Alice can compress a large circuit f into a small digest. Bob can encrypt some data x under this digest in a way that enables Alice to recover f(x) without learning anything else about Bob's data. For the scheme to be laconic, we require that the size of the digest, the run-time of the encryption algorithm and the size of the ciphertext should all be small, much smaller than the circuit-size of f. We construct an LFE scheme for general circuits under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, where the above parameters only grow polynomially with the depth but not the size of the circuit. We then use LFE to construct secure 2-party and multi-party computation (2PC, MPC) protocols with novel properties: We construct a 2-round 2PC protocol between Alice and Bob with respective inputs x A, x B in which Alice learns the output f(x A, x B ) in the second round. This is the first such protocol which is “Bob-optimized”, meaning that Alice does all the work while Bob's computation and the total communication of the protocol are smaller than the size of the circuit f or even Alice's input xA. In contrast, prior solutions based on fully homomorphic encryption are “Alice-optimized”. . We construct an MPC protocol, which allows N parties to securely evaluate a function f(x 1, .. ., x N ) over their respective inputs, where the total amount of computation performed by the parties during the protocol execution is smaller than that of evaluating the function itself! Each party has to individually pre-process the circuit f before the protocol starts and post-process the protocol transcript to recover the output after the protocol ends, and the cost of these steps is larger than the circuit size. However, this gives the first MPC where the computation performed by each party during the actual protocol execution, from the time the first protocol message is sent until the last protocol message is received, is smaller than the circuit size.

FOCS Conference 2010 Conference Paper

Black-Box, Round-Efficient Secure Computation via Non-malleability Amplification

  • Hoeteck Wee

We present round-efficient protocols for secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority that rely on black-box access to the underlying primitives. Our main contributions are as follows: · a O(log* n)-round protocol that relies on black-box access to dense cryptosystems, homomorphic encryption schemes, or lossy encryption schemes. This improves upon the recent O(1) log* n -round protocol of Lin, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam (STOC 2009) that relies on non-black-box access to a smaller class of primitives. · a O(1)-round protocol requiring in addition, black-box access to a one-way function with sub-exponential hardness, improving upon the recent work of Pass and Wee (Eurocrypt 2010). These are the first black-box constructions for secure computation with sublinear round complexity. Our constructions build on and improve upon the work of Lin and Pass (STOC 2009) on nonmalleability amplification, as well as that of Ishai et al. (STOC 2006) on black-box secure computation. In addition to the results on secure computation, we also obtain a simple construction of a 0(log* n)-round non-malleable commitment scheme based on one-way functions, improving upon the recent O(1) log* n -round protocol of Lin and Pass (STOC 2009). Our construction uses a novel transformation for handling arbitrary man-in-the-middle scheduling strategies which improves upon a previous construction of Barak (FOCS 2002).

STOC Conference 2009 Conference Paper

Inaccessible entropy

  • Iftach Haitner
  • Omer Reingold
  • Salil P. Vadhan
  • Hoeteck Wee

We put forth a new computational notion of entropy, which measures the (in)feasibility of sampling high entropy strings that are consistent with a given protocol. Specifically, we say that the i'th round of a protocol (A,B) has *accessible entropy* at most k, if no polynomial-time strategy A* can generate messages for A such that the entropy of its message in the i'th round has entropy greater than k when conditioned both on prior messages of the protocol and on prior coin tosses of A*. We say that the protocol has *inaccessible entropy* if the total accessible entropy (summed over the rounds) is noticeably smaller than the real entropy of A's messages, conditioned only on prior messages (but not the coin tosses of A). As applications of this notion, we -- Give a much simpler and more efficient construction of statistically hiding commitment schemes from arbitrary one-way functions. -- Prove that constant-round statistically hiding commitments are necessary for constructing constant-round zero-knowledge proof systems for NP that remain secure under parallel composition (assuming the existence of one-way functions).