Author name cluster

Hoda Bidkhori

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

3 papers

2 author rows

UAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Distributionally Robust Optimization as a Scalable Framework to Characterize Extreme Value Distributions

Patrick K. Kuiper
Ali Hasan
Wenhao Yang
Yuting Ng
Hoda Bidkhori
Jose H. Blanchet
Vahid Tarokh

The goal of this paper is to develop distributionally robust optimization (DRO) estimators, specifically for multidimensional Extreme Value Theory (EVT) statistics. EVT supports using semi-parametric models called max-stable distributions built from spatial Poisson point processes. While powerful, these models are only asymptotically valid for large samples. However, since extreme data is by definition scarce, the potential for model misspecification error is inherent to these applications, thus DRO estimators are natural. In order to mitigate over-conservative estimates while enhancing out-of-sample performance, we study DRO estimators informed by semi-parametric max-stable constraints in the space of point processes. We study both tractable convex formulations for some problems of interest (e. g. CVaR) and more general neural network based estimators. Both approaches are validated using synthetically generated data, recovering prescribed characteristics, and verifying the efficacy of the proposed techniques. Additionally, the proposed method is applied to a real data set of financial returns for comparison to a previous analysis. We established the proposed model as a novel formulation in the multivariate EVT domain, and innovative with respect to performance when compared to relevant alternate proposals.

Details

UAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Kidney Exchange with Inhomogeneous Edge Existence Uncertainty

Hoda Bidkhori
John Dickerson 0001
Duncan C. McElfresh
Ke Ren

Patients with end-stage renal failure often find kidney donors who are willing to donate a life-saving kidney, but who are medically incompatible with the patients. Kidney exchanges are organized barter markets that allow such incompatible patient-donor pairs to enter as a single agent—where the patient is endowed with a donor “item”—and engage in trade with other similar agents, such that all agents “give” a donor organ if and only if they receive an organ in return. In practice, organized trades occur in large cyclic or chain-like structures, with multiple agents participating in the exchange event. Planned trades can fail for a variety of reasons, such as unforeseen logistical challenges, or changes in patient or donor health. These failures cause major inefficiency in fielded exchanges, as if even one individual trade fails in a planned cycle or chain, \emph{all or most of the resulting cycle or chain fails}. Ad-hoc, as well as optimization-based methods, have been developed to handle failure uncertainty; nevertheless, the majority of the existing methods use very simplified assumptions about failure uncertainty and/or are not scalable for real-world kidney exchanges. Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the failures can have nonidentical probabilities. To the best of our knowledge, the state-of-the-art approaches are only tractable when failure probabilities are identical. We formulate a relevant non-convex optimization problem and propose a tractable mixed-integer linear programming reformulation to solve it. In addition, we propose a model that integrates both risks and the expected utilities of the matching by incorporating conditional value at risk (CVaR) into the objective function, providing a robust formulation for this problem. Subsequently, we propose a sample-average-approximation (SAA) based approach to solve this problem. We test our approaches on data from the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and compare against state-of-the-art approaches. Our model provides better performance with the same running time as a leading deterministic approach (PICEF). Our CVaR extensions with an SAA-based method improves the $\alpha \times 100%$ ($0<\alpha\leq 1$) worst-case performance substantially compared to existing models.

Details

AAAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Scalable Robust Kidney Exchange

Duncan C McElfresh
Hoda Bidkhori
John P Dickerson

In barter exchanges, participants directly trade their endowed goods in a constrained economic setting without money. Transactions in barter exchanges are often facilitated via a central clearinghouse that must match participants even in the face of uncertainty—over participants, existence and quality of potential trades, and so on. Leveraging robust combinatorial optimization techniques, we address uncertainty in kidney exchange, a real-world barter market where patients swap (in)compatible paired donors. We provide two scalable robust methods to handle two distinct types of uncertainty in kidney exchange—over the quality and the existence of a potential match. The latter case directly addresses a weakness in all stochastic-optimization-based methods to the kidney exchange clearing problem, which all necessarily require explicit estimates of the probability of a transaction existing—a still-unsolved problem in this nascent market. We also propose a novel, scalable kidney exchange formulation that eliminates the need for an exponential-time constraint generation process in competing formulations, maintains provable optimality, and serves as a subsolver for our robust approach. For each type of uncertainty we demonstrate the benefits of robustness on real data from a large, fielded kidney exchange in the United States. We conclude by drawing parallels between robustness and notions of fairness in the kidney exchange setting.

PDF Details