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Guangyu Shen

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7 papers
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7

NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

BiScope: AI-generated Text Detection by Checking Memorization of Preceding Tokens

  • Hanxi Guo
  • Siyuan Cheng
  • Xiaolong Jin
  • Zhuo Zhang
  • Kaiyuan Zhang
  • Guanhong Tao
  • Guangyu Shen
  • Xiangyu Zhang

Detecting text generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) is a pressing need in order to identify and prevent misuse of these powerful models in a wide range of applications, which have highly undesirable consequences such as misinformation and academic dishonesty. Given a piece of subject text, many existing detection methods work by measuring the difficulty of LLM predicting the next token in the text from their prefix. In this paper, we make a critical observation that how well the current token’s output logits memorizes the closely preceding input tokens also provides strong evidence. Therefore, we propose a novel bi-directional calculation method that measures the cross-entropy losses between an output logits and the ground-truth token (forward) and between the output logits and the immediately preceding input token (backward). A classifier is trained to make the final prediction based on the statistics of these losses. We evaluate our system, named BISCOPE, on texts generated by five latest commercial LLMs across five heterogeneous datasets, including both natural language and code. BISCOPE demonstrates superior detection accuracy and robustness compared to six existing baseline methods, exceeding the state-of-the-art non-commercial methods’ detection accuracy by over 0. 30 F1 score, achieving over 0. 95 detection F1 score on average. It also outperforms the best commercial tool GPTZero that is based on a commercial LLM trained with an enormous volume of data. Code is available at https: //github. com/MarkGHX/BiScope.

AAAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Elijah: Eliminating Backdoors Injected in Diffusion Models via Distribution Shift

  • Shengwei An
  • Sheng-Yen Chou
  • Kaiyuan Zhang
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Guanhong Tao
  • Guangyu Shen
  • Siyuan Cheng
  • Shiqing Ma

Diffusion models (DM) have become state-of-the-art generative models because of their capability of generating high-quality images from noises without adversarial training. However, they are vulnerable to backdoor attacks as reported by recent studies. When a data input (e.g., some Gaussian noise) is stamped with a trigger (e.g., a white patch), the backdoored model always generates the target image (e.g., an improper photo). However, effective defense strategies to mitigate backdoors from DMs are underexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose the first backdoor detection and removal framework for DMs. We evaluate our framework Elijah on over hundreds of DMs of 3 types including DDPM, NCSN and LDM, with 13 samplers against 3 existing backdoor attacks. Extensive experiments show that our approach can have close to 100% detection accuracy and reduce the backdoor effects to close to zero without significantly sacrificing the model utility.

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Django: Detecting Trojans in Object Detection Models via Gaussian Focus Calibration

  • Guangyu Shen
  • Siyuan Cheng
  • Guanhong Tao
  • Kaiyuan Zhang
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Shengwei An
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Xiangyu Zhang

Object detection models are vulnerable to backdoor or trojan attacks, where an attacker can inject malicious triggers into the model, leading to altered behavior during inference. As a defense mechanism, trigger inversion leverages optimization to reverse-engineer triggers and identify compromised models. While existing trigger inversion methods assume that each instance from the support set is equally affected by the injected trigger, we observe that the poison effect can vary significantly across bounding boxes in object detection models due to its dense prediction nature, leading to an undesired optimization objective misalignment issue for existing trigger reverse-engineering methods. To address this challenge, we propose the first object detection backdoor detection framework Django (Detecting Trojans in Object Detection Models via Gaussian Focus Calibration). It leverages a dynamic Gaussian weighting scheme that prioritizes more vulnerable victim boxes and assigns appropriate coefficients to calibrate the optimization objective during trigger inversion. In addition, we combine Django with a novel label proposal pre-processing technique to enhance its efficiency. We evaluate Django on 3 object detection image datasets, 3 model architectures, and 2 types of attacks, with a total of 168 models. Our experimental results show that Django outperforms 6 state-of-the-art baselines, with up to 38% accuracy improvement and 10x reduced overhead. The code is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/DJGO.

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

FLIP: A Provable Defense Framework for Backdoor Mitigation in Federated Learning

  • Kaiyuan Zhang 0002
  • Guanhong Tao 0001
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Siyuan Cheng 0005
  • Shengwei An
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Shiwei Feng 0002
  • Guangyu Shen

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables different parties to train a model together for high quality and strong privacy protection. In this scenario, individual participants may get compromised and perform backdoor attacks by poisoning the data (or gradients). Existing work on robust aggregation and certified FL robustness does not study how hardening benign clients can affect the global model (and the malicious clients). In this work, we theoretically analyze the connection among cross-entropy loss, attack success rate, and clean accuracy in this setting. Moreover, we propose a trigger reverse engineering based defense and show that our method can achieve robustness improvement with guarantee (i.e., reducing the attack success rate) without affecting benign accuracy. We conduct comprehensive experiments across different datasets and attack settings. Our results on nine competing SOTA defense methods show the empirical superiority of our method on both single-shot and continuous FL backdoor attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/KaiyuanZh/FLIP.

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

ParaFuzz: An Interpretability-Driven Technique for Detecting Poisoned Samples in NLP

  • Lu Yan
  • Zhuo Zhang
  • Guanhong Tao
  • Kaiyuan Zhang
  • Xuan Chen
  • Guangyu Shen
  • Xiangyu Zhang

Backdoor attacks have emerged as a prominent threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, where the presence of specific triggers in the input can lead poisoned models to misclassify these inputs to predetermined target classes. Current detection mechanisms are limited by their inability to address more covert backdoor strategies, such as style-based attacks. In this work, we propose an innovative test-time poisoned sample detection framework that hinges on the interpretability of model predictions, grounded in the semantic meaning of inputs. We contend that triggers (e. g. , infrequent words) are not supposed to fundamentally alter the underlying semantic meanings of poisoned samples as they want to stay stealthy. Based on this observation, we hypothesize that while the model's predictions for paraphrased clean samples should remain stable, predictions for poisoned samples should revert to their true labels upon the mutations applied to triggers during the paraphrasing process. We employ ChatGPT, a state-of-the-art large language model, as our paraphraser and formulate the trigger-removal task as a prompt engineering problem. We adopt fuzzing, a technique commonly used for unearthing software vulnerabilities, to discover optimal paraphrase prompts that can effectively eliminate triggers while concurrently maintaining input semantics. Experiments on 4 types of backdoor attacks, including the subtle style backdoors, and 4 distinct datasets demonstrate that our approach surpasses baseline methods, including STRIP, RAP, and ONION, in precision and recall.

ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Constrained Optimization with Dynamic Bound-scaling for Effective NLP Backdoor Defense

  • Guangyu Shen
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Guanhong Tao 0001
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Zhuo Zhang 0002
  • Shengwei An
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Xiangyu Zhang 0001

Modern language models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. An injected malicious token sequence (i. e. , a trigger) can cause the compromised model to misbehave, raising security concerns. Trigger inversion is a widely-used technique for scanning backdoors in vision models. It can- not be directly applied to NLP models due to their discrete nature. In this paper, we develop a novel optimization method for NLP backdoor inversion. We leverage a dynamically reducing temperature coefficient in the softmax function to provide changing loss landscapes to the optimizer such that the process gradually focuses on the ground truth trigger, which is denoted as a one-hot value in a convex hull. Our method also features a temperature rollback mechanism to step away from local optimals, exploiting the observation that local optimals can be easily determined in NLP trigger inversion (while not in general optimization). We evaluate the technique on over 1600 models (with roughly half of them having injected backdoors) on 3 prevailing NLP tasks, with 4 different backdoor attacks and 7 architectures. Our results show that the technique is able to effectively and efficiently detect and remove backdoors, outperforming 5 baseline methods. The code is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/DBS.

ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Backdoor Scanning for Deep Neural Networks through K-Arm Optimization

  • Guangyu Shen
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Guanhong Tao 0001
  • Shengwei An
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Siyuan Cheng 0005
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Xiangyu Zhang 0001

Back-door attack poses a severe threat to deep learning systems. It injects hidden malicious behaviors to a model such that any input stamped with a special pattern can trigger such behaviors. Detecting back-door is hence of pressing need. Many existing defense techniques use optimization to generate the smallest input pattern that forces the model to misclassify a set of benign inputs injected with the pattern to a target label. However, the complexity is quadratic to the number of class labels such that they can hardly handle models with many classes. Inspired by Multi-Arm Bandit in Reinforcement Learning, we propose a K-Arm optimization method for backdoor detection. By iteratively and stochastically selecting the most promising labels for optimization with the guidance of an objective function, we substantially reduce the complexity, allowing to handle models with many classes. Moreover, by iteratively refining the selection of labels to optimize, it substantially mitigates the uncertainty in choosing the right labels, improving detection accuracy. At the time of submission, the evaluation of our method on over 4000 models in the IARPA TrojAI competition from round 1 to the latest round 4 achieves top performance on the leaderboard. Our technique also supersedes five state-of-the-art techniques in terms of accuracy and the scanning time needed. The code of our work is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/K-ARM_Backdoor_Optimization

v2026.09.13