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Gerardo Berbeglia

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3 papers

1 author row

IJCAI Conference 2016 Conference Paper

Asymptotic Optimality of Myopic Optimization in Trial-Offer Markets with Social Influence

Andr
eacute; s Abeliuk
Gerardo Berbeglia
Felipe Maldonado
Pascal Van Hentenryck

We study dynamic trial-offer markets, in which participants first try a product and later decide whether to purchase it or not. In these markets, social influence and position biases have a greater effect on the decisions taken in the sampling stage than those in the buying stage. We consider a myopic policy that maximizes the market efficiency for each incoming participant, taking into account the inherent quality of products, position biases, and social influence. We prove that this myopic policy is optimal and predictable asymptotically.

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IJCAI Conference 2016 Conference Paper

Interdependent Scheduling Games

Andres Abeliuk
Haris Aziz
Gerardo Berbeglia
Serge Gaspers
Petr Kalina
Nicholas Mattei
Dominik Peters
Paul Stursberg

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e. g. , restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.

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IJCAI Conference 2015 Conference Paper

A Bargaining Mechanism for One-Way Games

Andres Abeliuk
Gerardo Berbeglia
Pascal Van Hentenryck

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supplychains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and the social cost of any ex-post efficient mechanism, can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes- Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational, and efficient. Finally, we propose a privacypreserving mechanism that is incentive-compatible and budget-balanced, satisfies ex-post individual rationality conditions, and produces an outcome which is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments.

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