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Gali Noti

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4 papers

2 author rows

ICLR Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces

Omer Nahum
Gali Noti
David C. Parkes
Nir Rosenfeld

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling *representations*---the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of *decongestion by representation*, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a *differentiable proxy of welfare* that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

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IJCAI Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Learning When to Advise Human Decision Makers

Gali Noti
Yiling Chen

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly used for providing advice to facilitate human decision making in a wide range of domains, such as healthcare, criminal justice, and finance. Motivated by limitations of the current practice where algorithmic advice is provided to human users as a constant element in the decision-making pipeline, in this paper we raise the question of when should algorithms provide advice? We propose a novel design of AI systems in which the algorithm interacts with the human user in a two-sided manner and aims to provide advice only when it is likely to be beneficial for the user in making their decision. The results of a large-scale experiment show that our advising approach manages to provide advice at times of need and to significantly improve human decision making compared to fixed, non-interactive, advising approaches. This approach has additional advantages in facilitating human learning, preserving complementary strengths of human decision makers, and leading to more positive responsiveness to the advice.

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AAAI Conference 2021 Conference Paper

From Behavioral Theories to Econometrics: Inferring Preferences of Human Agents from Data on Repeated Interactions

Gali Noti

We consider the problem of estimating preferences of human agents from data of strategic systems where the agents repeatedly interact. Recently, it was demonstrated that a new estimation method called “quantal regret” produces more accurate estimates for human agents than the classic approach that assumes that agents are rational and reach a Nash equilibrium; however, this method has not been compared to methods that take into account behavioral aspects of human play. In this paper we leverage equilibrium concepts from behavioral economics for this purpose and ask how well they perform compared to the quantal regret and Nash equilibrium methods. We develop four estimation methods based on established behavioral equilibrium models to infer the utilities of human agents from observed data of normal-form games. The equilibrium models we study are quantal-response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse-balance equilibrium. We show that in some of these concepts the inference is achieved analytically via closed formulas, while in the others the inference is achieved only algorithmically. We use experimental data of 2x2 games to evaluate the estimation success of these behavioral equilibrium methods. The results show that the estimates they produce are more accurate than the estimates of the Nash equilibrium. The comparison with the quantalregret method shows that the behavioral methods have better hit rates, but the quantal-regret method performs better in terms of the overall mean squared error, and we discuss the differences between the methods.

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IJCAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Neural Networks for Predicting Human Interactions in Repeated Games

Yoav Kolumbus
Gali Noti

We consider the problem of predicting human players' actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior of individual players in previously unseen games. We study the ability of neural networks to perform such predictions and the information that they require. We show on a dataset of normal-form games from experiments with human participants that standard neural networks are able to learn functions that provide more accurate predictions of the players' actions than established models from behavioral economics. The networks outperform the other models in terms of prediction accuracy and cross-entropy, and yield higher economic value. We show that if the available input is only of a short sequence of play, economic information about the game is important for predicting behavior of human agents. However, interestingly, we find that when the networks are trained with long enough sequences of history of play, action-based networks do well and additional economic details about the game do not improve their performance, indicating that the sequence of actions encode sufficient information for the success in the prediction task.

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