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Florian Funke

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IJCAI Conference 2021 Conference Paper

A Game-Theoretic Account of Responsibility Allocation

Christel Baier
Florian Funke
Rupak Majumdar

When designing or analyzing multi-agent systems, a fundamental problem is responsibility ascription: to specify which agents are responsible for the joint outcome of their behaviors and to which extent. We model strategic multi-agent interaction as an extensive form game of imperfect information and define notions of forward (prospective) and backward (retrospective) responsibility. Forward responsibility identifies the responsibility of a group of agents for an outcome along all possible plays, whereas backward responsibility identifies the responsibility along a given play. We further distinguish between strategic and causal backward responsibility, where the former captures the epistemic knowledge of players along a play, while the latter formalizes which players – possibly unknowingly – caused the outcome. A formal connection between forward and backward notions is established in the case of perfect recall. We further ascribe quantitative responsibility through cooperative game theory. We show through a number of examples that our approach encompasses several prior formal accounts of responsibility attribution.

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AAAI Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Responsibility Attribution in Parameterized Markovian Models

Christel Baier
Florian Funke
Rupak Majumdar

We consider the problem of responsibility attribution in the setting of parametric Markov chains. Given a family of Markov chains over a set of parameters, and a property, responsibility attribution asks how the difference in the value of the property should be attributed to the parameters when they change from one point in the parameter space to another. We formalize responsibility as path-based attribution schemes studied in cooperative game theory. An attribution scheme in a game determines how a value (a surplus or a cost) is distributed among a set of participants. Path-based attribution schemes include the well-studied Aumann-Shapley and the Shapley-Shubik schemes. In our context, an attribution scheme measures the responsibility of each parameter on the value function of the parametric Markov chain. We study the decision problem for path-based attribution schemes. Our main technical result is an algorithm for deciding if a path-based attribution scheme for a rational (ratios of polynomials) cost function is over a rational threshold. In particular, it is decidable if the Aumann-Shapley value for a player is at least a given rational number. As a consequence, we show that responsibility attribution is decidable for parametric Markov chains and for a general class of properties that include expectation and variance of discounted sum and long-run average rewards, as well as specifications in temporal logic.

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