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Easwar Subramanian

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5 papers
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5

IJCAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Auctions Inspired by Equilibrium Analysis

  • Bharat Manvi
  • Sanjay Chandlekar
  • Easwar Subramanian

We consider a periodic double auction (PDA) wherein the main participants are wholesale suppliers and brokers representing retailers. The suppliers are represented by a composite supply curve and the brokers are represented by individual bids. Additionally, the brokers can also participate in small-scale selling by placing individual asks; hence, they act as prosumers. Specifically, in a PDA, the prosumers who are net buyers have multiple opportunities to buy or sell multiple units of a commodity with the aim of minimising the cost of buying across multiple rounds of the PDA. Formulating optimal bidding strategies for such a PDA setting involves planning across current and future rounds while taking into account the bidding strategies of other agents. In this work, we propose Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) policies for a setup where multiple prosumers with knowledge of the composite supply curve compete to procure commodities. Thereafter, the MPNE policies are used to develop an algorithm called MPNE-BBS for the case wherein the prosumers need to re-construct an approximate composite supply curve using past auction information. The efficacy of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated on the PowerTAC wholesale market simulator against several baselines and state-of-the-art bidding policies.

AAMAS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Multi-unit Double Auctions: Equilibrium Analysis and Bidding Strategy using DDPG in Smart-grids

  • Sanjay Chandlekar
  • Easwar Subramanian
  • Sanjay Bhat
  • Praveen Paruchuri
  • Sujit Gujar

We present a Nash equilibrium analysis for single-buyer singleseller multi-unit š‘˜-double auctions for scaling-based bidding strategies. We then design a Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) based learning strategy, DDPGBBS, for a participating agent to suggest bids that approximately achieve the above Nash equilibrium. We expand DDPGBBS to be helpful in more complex settings with multiple buyers/sellers trading multiple units in a Periodic Double Auction (PDA), such as the wholesale market in smart-grids. We demonstrate the efficacy of DDPGBBS with Power Trading Agent Competition’s (PowerTAC) wholesale market PDA as a testbed.

IJCAI Conference 2022 Conference Paper

VidyutVanika21: An Autonomous Intelligent Broker for Smart-grids

  • Sanjay Chandlekar
  • Bala Suraj Pedasingu
  • Easwar Subramanian
  • Sanjay Bhat
  • Praveen Paruchuri
  • Sujit Gujar

An autonomous broker that liaises between retail customers and power-generating companies (GenCos) is essential for the smart grid ecosystem. The efficiency brought in by such brokers to the smart grid setup can be studied through a well-developed simulation environment. In this paper, we describe the design of one such energy broker called VidyutVanika21 (VV21) and analyze its performance using a simulation platform called PowerTAC (PowerTrading Agent Competition). Specifically, we discuss the retail (VV21–RM) and wholesale market (VV21–WM) modules of VV21 that help the broker achieve high net profits in a competitive setup. Supported by game-theoretic analysis, the VV21–RM designs tariff contracts that a) maintain a balanced portfolio of different types of customers; b) sustain an appropriate level of market share, and c) introduce surcharges on customers to reduce energy usage during peak demand times. The VV21–WM aims to reduce the cost of procurement by following the supply curve of the GenCo to identify its lowest ask for a particular auction which is then used to generate suitable bids. We further demonstrate the efficacy of the retail and wholesale strategies of VV21 in PowerTAC 2021 finals and through several controlled experiments.

AAAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Bidding in Smart Grid PDAs: Theory, Analysis and Strategy

  • Susobhan Ghosh
  • Sujit Gujar
  • Praveen Paruchuri
  • Easwar Subramanian
  • Sanjay Bhat

Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs) are commonly used in the real world for trading, e. g. in stock markets to determine stock opening prices, and energy markets to trade energy in order to balance net demand in smart grids, involving trillions of dollars in the process. A bidder, participating in such PDAs, has to plan for bids in the current auction as well as for the future auctions, which highlights the necessity of good bidding strategies. In this paper, we perform an equilibrium analysis of single unit single-shot double auctions with a certain clearing price and payment rule, which we refer to as ACPR, and find it intractable to analyze as number of participating agents increase. We further derive the best response for a bidder with complete information in a single-shot double auction with ACPR. Leveraging the theory developed for single-shot double auction and taking the PowerTAC wholesale market PDA as our testbed, we proceed by modeling the PDA of PowerTAC as an MDP. We propose a novel bidding strategy, namely MDPLCPBS. We empirically show that MDPLCPBS follows the equilibrium strategy for double auctions that we previously analyze. In addition, we benchmark our strategy against the baseline and the state-of-the-art bidding strategies for the PowerTAC wholesale market PDAs, and show that MDPLCPBS outperforms most of them consistently.

AAAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

VidyutVanika: A Reinforcement Learning Based Broker Agent for a Power Trading Competition

  • Susobhan Ghosh
  • Easwar Subramanian
  • Sanjay P. Bhat
  • Sujit Gujar
  • Praveen Paruchuri

A smart grid is an efficient and sustainable energy system that integrates diverse generation entities, distributed storage capacity, and smart appliances and buildings. A smart grid brings new kinds of participants in the energy market served by it, whose effect on the grid can only be determined through high fidelity simulations. Power TAC offers one such simulation platform using real-world weather data and complex state-of-the-art customer models. In Power TAC, autonomous energy brokers compete to make profits across tariff, wholesale and balancing markets while maintaining the stability of the grid. In this paper, we design an autonomous broker VidyutVanika, the runner-up in the 2018 Power TAC competition. VidyutVanika relies on reinforcement learning (RL) in the tariff market and dynamic programming in the wholesale market to solve modified versions of known Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulations in the respective markets. The novelty lies in defining the reward functions for MDPs, solving these MDPs, and the application of these solutions to real actions in the market. Unlike previous participating agents, VidyutVanika uses a neural network to predict the energy consumption of various customers using weather data. We use several heuristic ideas to bridge the gap between the restricted action spaces of the MDPs and the much more extensive action space available to VidyutVanika. These heuristics allow VidyutVanika to convert near-optimal fixed tariffs to time-of-use tariffs aimed at mitigating transmission capacity fees, spread out its orders across several auctions in the wholesale market to procure energy at a lower price, more accurately estimate parameters required for implementing the MDP solution in the wholesale market, and account for wholesale procurement costs while optimizing tariffs. We use Power TAC 2018 tournament data and controlled experiments to analyze the performance of VidyutVanika, and illustrate the efficacy of the above strategies.