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Donald Perlis

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17 papers
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17

JAAMAS Journal 2026 Journal Article

A Logic for Characterizing Multiple Bounded Agents

  • John Grant
  • Sarit Kraus
  • Donald Perlis

Abstract We describe a meta-logic for characterizing the evolving internal reasoning of various families of agents. We view the reasoning of agents as ongoing processes rather than as fixed sets of conclusions. Our approach utilizes a strongly sorted calculus, distinguishing the application language, time, and various syntactic sorts. We have established soundness and completeness results corresponding to various families of agents. This allows for useful and intuitively natural characterizations of such agents' reasoning abilities. We discuss and contrast consistency issues as in the work of Montague and Thomason. We also show how to represent the concept of focus of attention in this framework.

AIJ Journal 2005 Journal Article

A logic-based model of intention formation and action for multi-agent subcontracting

  • John Grant
  • Sarit Kraus
  • Donald Perlis

We present a formalism for representing the formation of intentions by agents engaged in cooperative activity. We use a syntactic approach presenting a formal logical calculus that can be regarded as a meta-logic that describes the reasoning and activities of the agents. Our central focus is on the evolving intentions of agents over time, and the conditions under which an agent can adopt and maintain an intention. In particular, the reasoning time and the time taken to subcontract are modeled explicitly in the logic. We axiomatize the concept of agent interactions in the meta-language, show that the meta-theory is consistent and describe the unique intended model of the meta-theory. In this context we deal both with subcontracting between agents and the presence of multiple recipes, that is, multiple ways of accomplishing tasks. We show that under various initial conditions and known facts about agent beliefs and abilities, the meta-theory representation yields good results.

AIJ Journal 1991 Journal Article

Nonmonotonicity and the scope of reasoning

  • David W. Etherington
  • Sarit Kraus
  • Donald Perlis

Circumscription, default logic, and autoepistemic logic capture aspects of the nonmonotonicity of human commonsense reasoning. However, Perlis has shown that circumscription suffers from certain counterintuitive limitations, concerning exceptions or “counterexamples” to defaults. We observe that the unfortunate limitations of circumscription are even broader than Perlis originally pointed out. Moreover, these limitations are not peculiar to circumscription; they appear to be endemic in nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms. We develop a general solution, involving restricting the scope of nonmonotonic reasoning, and show that it remedies these problems in a variety of formalisms. Our solution has a number of attractive aspects in addition to its generality. Most importantly, no modification of the underlying formalisms is required, and the result is semantically compatible with existing approaches. Furthermore, the necessary machinery is intuitively plausible and, arguably, useful for other purposes. Finally, the solution is robust: it is relatively tolerant of imprecise determinations of scope.

AIJ Journal 1988 Journal Article

Autocircumscription

  • Donald Perlis

Reasoning can be used to select among various possible interpretations of events. But how are these possibilities determined? We isolate two key technical features of circumscription (consistency and minimization), and use the first as the basis for a reformulation of the circumscription principle in a way related to possibility, self-knowledge, and negative introspection. The second (minimization) then can be separately expressed on its own. Conceptual clarity and a kind of validity are results of this separation, as well as a computational means to determine (sometimes) when a wff is not among a reasoner's conclusions.

AIJ Journal 1988 Journal Article

Languages with self-reference II

  • Donald Perlis

Negative results of Montague and Thomason have diverted research in propositional attitudes away from syntactic (“first-order”) approaches, encouraging modal formalisms instead, especially in representing epistemic notions. We show that modal logics are on no firmer ground than first-order ones when equally endowed with substitutive self-reference. Nonetheless, there may still be remedies, hinging in part upon a distinction between “dynamic” and “static” notions of provability and belief (an earlier version of this paper emphasized a somewhat different distinction).

AIJ Journal 1987 Journal Article

Circumscribing with sets

  • Donald Perlis

Sets can play an important role in circumscription's ability to deal in a general way with certain aspects of commonsense reasoning. A result of Kueker indicates that sentences that intuitively one would want circumscription to prove are nonetheless not so provable in a formal setting devoid of sets. Furthermore, when sets are introduced, first-order circumscription handles these cases very easily, obviating the need for second-order circumscription. The “Aussonderungs” axiom of ZF set theory plays an intuitive role in this shift back to a first-order language

AIJ Journal 1986 Journal Article

Completeness results for circumscription

  • Donald Perlis
  • Jack Minker

We investigate the model theory of the notion of circumscription, and find completeness theorems that provide a partial converse to a result of McCarthy. We show that the circumscriptive theorems are precisely the truths of the minimal models, in the case of various classes of theories, and for various versions of circumscription. We also present an example of commonsense reasoning in which first-order circumscription does not achieve the intuitive and desired minimization.

AAAI Conference 1986 Conference Paper

Self-Reference, Knowledge, Belief, and Modality

  • Donald Perlis

An apparently negative result of Montague has diverted research in formal modalities away from syntactic ("first-order") approaches, encouraging rather weak and semantically complex modal formalisms, especially in representing epistemic notions. We show that, Montague notwithstanding, consistent and straightforward first-order syntactic treatments of modality are possible, especially for belief and knowledge; that the usual modal treatments are on no firmer ground than first-order ones when endowed with self-reference; and that in the latter case there still are remedies.

AIJ Journal 1985 Journal Article

Languages with self-reference I: Foundations

  • Donald Perlis

It is argued that a proper treatment of cognitive notions such as beliefs and concepts should allow broad and consistent expression of syntax and semantics, and that this in turn depends on self-reference. A theory of quotation and unquotation is presented to this end that appears to make unnecessary the usual hierarchical and non-first-order constructions for these notions. In the current paper (Part I) the underlying theory is presented; a sequel will treat in more detail the applications to cognition.

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