Arrow Research search

Author name cluster

Chaoyi Zhu

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

3 papers
2 author rows

Possible papers

3

ICLR Conference 2025 Conference Paper

TabWak: A Watermark for Tabular Diffusion Models

  • Chaoyi Zhu
  • Jiayi Tang
  • Jeroen M. Galjaard
  • Pin-Yu Chen
  • Robert Birke
  • Cornelis Bos
  • Lydia Y. Chen

Synthetic data offers alternatives for data augmentation and sharing. Till date, it remains unknown how to use watermarking techniques to trace and audit synthetic tables generated by tabular diffusion models to mitigate potential misuses. In this paper, we design TabWak, the first watermarking method to embed invisible signatures that control the sampling of Gaussian latent codes used to synthesize table rows via the diffusion backbone. TabWak has two key features. Different from existing image watermarking techniques, TabWak uses self-cloning and shuffling to embed the secret key in positional information of random seeds that control the Gaussian latents, allowing to use different seeds at each row for high inter-row diversity and enabling row-wise detectability. To further boost the robustness of watermark detection against post-editing attacks, TabWak uses a valid-bit mechanism that focuses on the tail of the latent code distribution for superior noise resilience. We provide theoretical guarantees on the row diversity and effectiveness of detectability. We evaluate TabWak on five datasets against baselines to show that the quality of watermarked tables remains nearly indistinguishable from non-watermarked tables while achieving high detectability in the presence of strong post-editing attacks, with a 100% true positive rate at a 0.1% false positive rate on synthetic tables with fewer than 300 rows. Our code is available at the following anonymized repository https://github.com/chaoyitud/TabWak.

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

TimeWak: Temporal Chained-Hashing Watermark for Time Series Data

  • Zhi Wen Soi
  • Chaoyi Zhu
  • Fouad Abiad
  • Aditya Shankar
  • Jeroen Galjaard
  • Huijuan Wang
  • Lydia Chen

Synthetic time series generated by diffusion models enable sharing privacy-sensitive datasets, such as patients' functional MRI records. Key criteria for synthetic data include high data utility and traceability to verify the data source. Recent watermarking methods embed in homogeneous latent spaces, but state-of-the-art time series generators operate in data space, making latent-based watermarking incompatible. This creates the challenge of watermarking directly in data space while handling feature heterogeneity and temporal dependencies. We propose TimeWak, the first watermarking algorithm for multivariate time series diffusion models. To handle temporal dependence and spatial heterogeneity, TimeWak embeds a temporal chained-hashing watermark directly within the temporal-feature data space. The other unique feature is the $\epsilon$-exact inversion, which addresses the non-uniform reconstruction error distribution across features from inverting the diffusion process to detect watermarks. We derive the error bound of inverting multivariate time series while preserving robust watermark detectability. We extensively evaluate TimeWak on its impact on synthetic data quality, watermark detectability, and robustness under various post-editing attacks, against five datasets and baselines of different temporal lengths. Our results show that TimeWak achieves improvements of 61. 96% in context-FID score, and 8. 44% in correlational scores against the strongest state-of-the-art baseline, while remaining consistently detectable.

ICML Conference 2023 Conference Paper

LeadFL: Client Self-Defense against Model Poisoning in Federated Learning

  • Chaoyi Zhu
  • Stefanie Roos
  • Lydia Y. Chen

Federated Learning is highly susceptible to backdoor and targeted attacks as participants can manipulate their data and models locally without any oversight on whether they follow the correct process. There are a number of server-side defenses that mitigate the attacks by modifying or rejecting local updates submitted by clients. However, we find that bursty adversarial patterns with a high variance in the number of malicious clients can circumvent the existing defenses. We propose a client-self defense, LeadFL, that is combined with existing server-side defenses to thwart backdoor and targeted attacks. The core idea of LeadFL is a novel regularization term in local model training such that the Hessian matrix of local gradients is nullified. We provide the convergence analysis of LeadFL and its robustness guarantee in terms of certified radius. Our empirical evaluation shows that LeadFL is able to mitigate bursty adversarial patterns for both iid and non-iid data distributions. It frequently reduces the backdoor accuracy from more than 75% for state-of-the-art defenses to less than 10% while its impact on the main task accuracy is always less than for other client-side defenses.

v2026.09.13