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Changjiang Li

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7 papers
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7

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

Bridging the Copyright Gap: Do Large Vision-Language Models Recognize and Respect Copyrighted Content?

  • Naen Xu
  • Jinghuai Zhang
  • Changjiang Li
  • Hengyu An
  • Chunyi Zhou
  • Jun Wang
  • Boyu Xu
  • Yuyuan Li

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have achieved remarkable advancements in multimodal reasoning tasks. However, their widespread accessibility raises critical concerns about potential copyright infringement. Will LVLMs accurately recognize and comply with copyright regulations when encountering copyrighted content (i.e., user input, retrieved documents) in the context? Failure to comply with copyright regulations may lead to serious legal and ethical consequences, particularly when LVLMs generate responses based on copyrighted materials (e.g., retrieved book experts, news reports). In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation of various LVLMs, examining how they handle copyrighted content – such as book excerpts, news articles, music lyrics, and code documentation when they are presented as visual inputs. To systematically measure copyright compliance, we introduce a large-scale benchmark dataset comprising 50,000 multimodal query-content pairs designed to evaluate how effectively LVLMs handle queries that could lead to copyright infringement. Given that real-world copyrighted content may or may not include a copyright notice, the dataset includes query-content pairs in two distinct scenarios: with and without a copyright notice. For the former, we extensively cover four types of copyright notices to account for different cases. Our evaluation reveals that even state-of-the-art closed-source LVLMs exhibit significant deficiencies in recognizing and respecting the copyrighted content, even when presented with the copyright notice. To solve this limitation, we introduce a novel tool-augmented defense framework for copyright compliance, which reduces infringement risks in all scenarios. Our findings underscore the importance of developing copyright-aware LVLMs to ensure the responsible and lawful use of copyrighted content.

AAAI Conference 2025 Conference Paper

AIA: Autoregression-Based Injection Attacks Against Text2SQL Models

  • Deyin Li
  • Xiang Ling
  • Changjiang Li
  • Xiang Chen
  • Chunming Wu

To facilitate understanding of users' diverse queries against the back-end databases in web applications, researchers have introduced Text-to-SQL (Text2SQL) models that can generate well-structured SQL queries from users' query texts in natural language. As the Text2SQL model decouples the user queries with the back-end databases, it inherently mitigates the SQL injection risk posed by inserting users' input into pre-written SQL queries. However, what security risks to web applications may be posed by Text2SQL models remains an open question. In this paper, we present a new attack framework, named Autoregression-based Injection Attacks (AIA), to evaluate the security risks of Text2SQL models. In particular, AIA makes target models generate attack payloads by constructing specific inputs and adjusting the input auto-regressively. Our evaluation demonstrates that AIA can cause Text2SQL models to generate target output by adversarial inputs with success rates of over 70% in most scenarios. The generated adversarial input has certain transferability in target Text2SQL models. Additionally, practice experiments show that AIA can make Text2SQL models extract user lists from databases and even delete data in databases directly.

ICLR Conference 2025 Conference Paper

RAPID: Retrieval Augmented Training of Differentially Private Diffusion Models

  • Tanqiu Jiang
  • Changjiang Li
  • Fenglong Ma
  • Ting Wang 0006

Differentially private diffusion models (DPDMs) harness the remarkable generative capabilities of diffusion models while enforcing differential privacy (DP) for sensitive data. However, existing DPDM training approaches often suffer from significant utility loss, large memory footprint, and expensive inference cost, impeding their practical uses. To overcome such limitations, we present RAPID: Retrieval Augmented PrIvate Diffusion model, a novel approach that integrates retrieval augmented generation (RAG) into DPDM training. Specifically, RAPID leverages available public data to build a knowledge base of sample trajectories; when training the diffusion model on private data, RAPID computes the early sampling steps as queries, retrieves similar trajectories from the knowledge base as surrogates, and focuses on training the later sampling steps in a differentially private manner. Extensive evaluation using benchmark datasets and models demonstrates that, with the same privacy guarantee, RAPID significantly outperforms state-of-the-art approaches by large margins in generative quality, memory footprint, and inference cost, suggesting that retrieval-augmented DP training represents a promising direction for developing future privacy-preserving generative models. The code is available at: https://github.com/TanqiuJiang/RAPID

ICLR Conference 2025 Conference Paper

RobustKV: Defending Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks via KV Eviction

  • Tanqiu Jiang
  • Zian Wang
  • Jiacheng Liang
  • Changjiang Li
  • Yuhui Wang 0003
  • Ting Wang 0006

Jailbreak attacks circumvent LLMs' built-in safeguards by concealing harmful queries within adversarial prompts. While most existing defenses attempt to mitigate the effects of adversarial prompts, they often prove inadequate as adversarial prompts can take arbitrary, adaptive forms. This paper introduces RobustKV, a novel jailbreak defense that takes a fundamentally different approach by selectively removing critical tokens of harmful queries from key-value (KV) caches. Intuitively, for an adversarial prompt to be effective, its tokens must achieve sufficient `importance' (measured by attention scores), which consequently lowers the importance of tokens in the concealed harmful query. Therefore, by carefully evicting the KVs of low-ranked tokens, RobustKV minimizes the harmful query's presence in the KV cache, thus preventing the LLM from generating informative responses. Extensive evaluation using benchmark datasets and models demonstrates that RobustKV effectively counters state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks while maintaining the LLM's performance on benign queries. Notably, RobustKV creates an interesting effectiveness-evasiveness dilemma for the adversary, leading to its robustness against adaptive attacks.{(Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful content generated by LLMs.)}

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Defending Pre-trained Language Models as Few-shot Learners against Backdoor Attacks

  • Zhaohan Xi
  • Tianyu Du
  • Changjiang Li
  • Ren Pang
  • Shouling Ji
  • Jinghui Chen
  • Fenglong Ma
  • Ting Wang

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance as few-shot learners. However, their security risks under such settings are largely unexplored. In this work, we conduct a pilot study showing that PLMs as few-shot learners are highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks while existing defenses are inadequate due to the unique challenges of few-shot scenarios. To address such challenges, we advocate MDP, a novel lightweight, pluggable, and effective defense for PLMs as few-shot learners. Specifically, MDP leverages the gap between the masking-sensitivity of poisoned and clean samples: with reference to the limited few-shot data as distributional anchors, it compares the representations of given samples under varying masking and identifies poisoned samples as ones with significant variations. We show analytically that MDP creates an interesting dilemma for the attacker to choose between attack effectiveness and detection evasiveness. The empirical evaluation using benchmark datasets and representative attacks validates the efficacy of MDP. The code of MDP is publicly available.

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

IMPRESS: Evaluating the Resilience of Imperceptible Perturbations Against Unauthorized Data Usage in Diffusion-Based Generative AI

  • Bochuan Cao
  • Changjiang Li
  • Ting Wang
  • Jinyuan Jia
  • Bo Li
  • Jinghui Chen

Diffusion-based image generation models, such as Stable Diffusion or DALL·E 2, are able to learn from given images and generate high-quality samples following the guidance from prompts. For instance, they can be used to create artistic images that mimic the style of an artist based on his/her original artworks or to maliciously edit the original images for fake content. However, such ability also brings serious ethical issues without proper authorization from the owner of the original images. In response, several attempts have been made to protect the original images from such unauthorized data usage by adding imperceptible perturbations, which are designed to mislead the diffusion model and make it unable to properly generate new samples. In this work, we introduce a perturbation purification platform, named IMPRESS, to evaluate the effectiveness of imperceptible perturbations as a protective measure. IMPRESS is based on the key observation that imperceptible perturbations could lead to a perceptible inconsistency between the original image and the diffusion-reconstructed image, which can be used to devise a new optimization strategy for purifying the image, which may weaken the protection of the original image from unauthorized data usage (e. g. , style mimicking, malicious editing). The proposed IMPRESS platform offers a comprehensive evaluation of several contemporary protection methods, and can be used as an evaluation platform for future protection methods.

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

The Dark Side of AutoML: Towards Architectural Backdoor Search

  • Ren Pang
  • Changjiang Li
  • Zhaohan Xi
  • Shouling Ji
  • Ting Wang 0006

This paper asks the intriguing question: is it possible to exploit neural architecture search (NAS) as a new attack vector to launch previously improbable attacks? Specifically, we present EVAS, a new attack that leverages NAS to find neural architectures with inherent backdoors and exploits such vulnerability using input-aware triggers. Compared with existing attacks, EVAS demonstrates many interesting properties: (i) it does not require polluting training data or perturbing model parameters; (ii) it is agnostic to downstream fine-tuning or even re-training from scratch; (iii) it naturally evades defenses that rely on inspecting model parameters or training data. With extensive evaluation on benchmark datasets, we show that EVAS features high evasiveness, transferability, and robustness, thereby expanding the adversary's design spectrum. We further characterize the mechanisms underlying EVAS, which are possibly explainable by architecture-level ``shortcuts'' that recognize trigger patterns. This work showcases that NAS can be exploited in a harmful way to find architectures with inherent backdoor vulnerability. The code is available at https://github.com/ain-soph/nas_backdoor.

v2026.09.13