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Bing Shi

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

7 papers
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7

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

Belief-Driven Value Alignment for Human-Robot Collaboration

  • Saisai Li
  • Bing Shi
  • Yiming Xia
  • Xiao Su

As intelligent systems advance rapidly, human-robot collaboration is becoming increasingly important. Ensuring that the intelligent agent's behaviors match human intentions and value preferences is crucial for effective collaboration, which is termed the value alignment problem. Within the Reinforcement Learning (RL) paradigm, value alignment typically relies on pre-designed reward functions, and Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL) is often used to model value alignment as a human-robot game. However, existing works often assume that human is perfectly rational, and can fully obtain robot’s belief on human’s preference. To address this limitation, we propose a Particle Filter-based Hierarchical Dynamic Programming algorithm (PFHDP). By modeling the robot's belief state, this algorithm ensures the correct updates of human's estimate of the robot's belief. This allows human to adopt more targeted pedagogical behaviors to guide the robot based on her understanding of the robot's current belief, achieving belief alignment between human and robot and thereby promoting value alignment more effectively. Furthermore, we run experiments to evaluate the proposed method in two cooperative scenarios against some typical benchmark approaches. The experimental results show that our method can strengthen the alignment of belief states between human and robot, leading to enhanced value alignment.

YNIMG Journal 2025 Journal Article

Enhancing the quality of kinesthetic motor imagery for complex motor skills through simulated muscle activation color visualization: Evidence from time-frequency and functional connectivity analyses

  • Xiaogang Ma
  • Bing Shi

It is well established that providing visual guidance within demonstration models positively influences the quality of kinesthetic motor imagery (kMI) for complex motor skills. Given that action execution and kMI share several underlying mechanisms, we hypothesize that color-coded visual cues indicating muscle activation in demonstration models can enhance the quality of kMI in the acquisition of complex motor skills. To test this hypothesis. We employed AnyBody Modeling System to develop demonstration model videos of complex motor skills. Thirty participants (mean age = 20.3 ± 0.6 years; 7 men and 8 women per group) were assigned to an experimental group, which engaged in kMI after viewing demonstration videos supplemented with simulated muscle activation color cues, or to a control group, which performed kMI following videos without such cues. All participants scored above 5 on the Motor Imagery Questionnaire-2 (MIQ-2). The vividness of kMI was assessed using the Vividness of Motor Imagery Questionnaire-2 (VMIQ-2). A 64-channel EEG cap was utilized for data acquisition. Changes in alpha and beta range oscillations during kMI were examined, and region of interest (ROI) analysis was conducted to extract the correlation coefficient matrix among kMI-related subcortical nuclei. Our results demonstrated that the vividness of kMI in the experimental group was significantly higher than that in the control group by 19.9 % (P < 0.05). Conversely, alpha event-related synchronization (ERS) in the parietal and occipital regions, as well as ERS in the frontal, central, and temporal regions, were significantly lower in the experimental group compared to the control group. The source-functional connectivity results revealed that the primary differences between the experimental and control groups were concentrated between the left V1 and right V1, as well as among the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and primary motor cortex (M1). In conclusion, the demonstration model, which incorporates simulated muscle activation and color visualization, enhances the vividness of kMI in complex motor skills. This enhancement is associated with the selective inhibition of the frontal, central, and temporal brain regions, the activation of the occipital and parietal regions within brain rhythmic activity, and increased information flow between the occipital-parietal and frontal-parietal brain regions.

EAAI Journal 2024 Journal Article

A vehicle value based ride-hailing order matching and dispatching algorithm

  • Bing Shi
  • Yiming Xia
  • Shuai Xu
  • Yikai Luo

Online ride-hailing has become one of the most important transportation ways. In the ride-hailing system, how to efficiently match orders with vehicles and dispatch idle vehicles are key issues. The ride-hailing platform needs to match orders with vehicles and dispatch idle vehicles efficiently to maximize social welfare. However, the matching and dispatching decisions at the current round may affect the supply and demand of ride-hailing in the future rounds since they will affect the future vehicle distributions in different geographical zones. In fact, vehicles in different zones at different times may have different values for the matching and dispatching results. In this paper, we use the vehicle value function to characterize the spatio-temporal value of vehicles in each zone and then use it to design the order matching and idle vehicle dispatching algorithm to improve the long-term social welfare. In addition, in the order matching, passengers may untruthfully report the maximum price they are willing to pay to maximize their own profits, which can affect the order matching and thus may result in the losses of the long-term social welfare. Therefore, we design a VCG based pricing algorithm to prevent the strategic behavior of passengers. We further run experiments to evaluate the proposed algorithm. The experimental results show that our algorithm can outperform the state-of-the-art algorithm in terms of social welfare by 11. 7% and service ratio by 11. 1%. This work can provide some useful insights for the online ride-hailing platform to design practical order matching and pricing strategies.

AAMAS Conference 2013 Conference Paper

RMASBench: A Benchmarking System for Multi-Agent Coordination in Urban Search and Rescue

  • Fabio Maffioletti
  • Riccardo Reffato
  • Alessandro Farinelli
  • Alexander Kleiner
  • Sarvapali Ramchurn
  • Bing Shi

This demonstration paper illustrates RMASBench, a new benchmarking system based on the RoboCup Rescue Agent simulator. The aim of the system is to facilitate benchmarking of coordination approaches in controlled settings for dynamic rescue scenarios. In particular, the key features of the systems are: i) programming interfaces to plug-in coordination algorithms without the need for implementing and tuning low-level agents’ behaviors, ii) implementations of state-of-the art coordination approaches: DSA and Max- Sum, iii) a large scale crowd simulator, which exploits GPUs parallel architecture, to simulate the behaviour of thousands of agents in real time.

JAAMAS Journal 2012 Journal Article

An equilibrium analysis of market selection strategies and fee strategies in competing double auction marketplaces

  • Bing Shi
  • Enrico H. Gerding
  • Nicholas R. Jennings

Abstract In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework for analysing competing double auction marketplaces that vie for traders and make profits by charging fees. Firstly, we analyse the equilibrium strategies for the traders’ market selection decision for given market fees using evolutionary game theory. Using this approach, we investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so doing, we show that, when the same type of fees are charged by two marketplaces, it is unlikely that competing marketplaces will continue to co-exist when traders converge to their equilibrium market selection strategies. Eventually, all the traders will congregate in one marketplace. However, when different types of fees are allowed (registration fees and profit fees), competing marketplaces are more likely to co-exist in equilibrium. We also find that sometimes all the traders eventually migrate to the marketplace that charges higher fees. We then further analyse this phenomenon, and specifically analyse how bidding strategies and random exploration of traders affects this migration respectively. Secondly, we analyse the equilibrium strategies of the marketplaces when they have the ability to vary their fees in response to changes in the traders’ market selection strategies. In this case, we consider the competition of the marketplaces as a two-stage game, where the traders’ market selection strategies are conditional on the market fees. In particular, we use a co-evolutionary approach to analyse how competing marketplaces dynamically set fees while taking into account the dynamics of the traders’ market selection strategies. In so doing, we find that two identical marketplaces undercut each other, and they will eventually charge the minimal fee as we set that guarantees positive market profits for them. Furthermore, we extend the co-evolutionary analysis of the marketplaces’ fee strategies to more general cases. Specifically, we analyse how an initially disadvantaged marketplace with an adaptive fee strategy can outperform an initially advantaged one with a fixed fee strategy, or even one with an adaptive fee strategy, and how competing marketplaces evolve their fee strategies when different types of fees are allowed.

AAMAS Conference 2010 Conference Paper

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces

  • Bing Shi
  • Enrico Gerding
  • Perukrishnen Vytelingum
  • Nicholas R. Jennings

In this paper, we propose a novel general framework foranalysing competing double auction markets that vie fortraders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on this framework, we analyse the competition between two markets in detail. Specifically, we game-theoretically analyse the equilibrium behaviour of traders' marketselection strategies and adopt evolutionary game theory toinvestigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In sodoing, we show that it is unlikely for these competing markets to coexist. Eventually, all traders will always convergeto locating themselves at one of the markets. Somewhatsurprisingly, we find that sometimes all traders converge tothe market that charges higher fees. Thus we further analyse this phenomenon, and specifically determine the factorsthat affect such migration.

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