AIJ Journal 2025 Journal Article
Approval-based committee voting under incomplete information
- Aviram Imber
- Jonas Israel
- Markus Brill
- Benny Kimelfeld
We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about the approval preferences of voters. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of candidates into approved , disapproved , and unknown candidates, possibly with ordinal preference constraints among candidates in the latter category. This captures scenarios where voters have not evaluated all candidates and/or it is unknown where voters draw the threshold between approved and disapproved candidates. We study the complexity of some fundamental computational problems for a number of classic approval-based committee voting rules including Proportional Approval Voting and Chamberlin–Courant. These problems include determining whether a given set of candidates is a possible or necessary winning committee and whether a given candidate is possibly or necessarily a member of the winning committee. We also consider proportional representation axioms and the problem of deciding whether a given committee is possibly or necessarily representative.