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Andrea Tacchetti

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12 papers

2 author rows

ICLR Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers

Denizalp Goktas
David C. Parkes
Ian Gemp
Luke Marris
Georgios Piliouras
Romuald Elie
Guy Lever
Andrea Tacchetti

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds for Lipschitz-smooth function approximators in a large class of concave pseudo-games, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

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TMLR Journal 2024 Journal Article

Rethinking Teacher-Student Curriculum Learning through the Cooperative Mechanics of Experience

Manfred Diaz
Liam Paull
Andrea Tacchetti

Teacher-Student Curriculum Learning (TSCL) is a curriculum learning framework that draws inspiration from human cultural transmission and learning. It involves a teacher algorithm shaping the learning process of a learner algorithm by exposing it to controlled experiences. Despite its success, understanding the conditions under which TSCL is effective remains challenging. In this paper, we propose a data-centric perspective to analyze the underlying mechanics of the teacher-student interactions in TSCL. We leverage cooperative game theory to describe how the composition of the set of experiences presented by the teacher to the learner, as well as their order, influences the performance of the curriculum that is found by TSCL approaches. To do so, we demonstrate that for every TSCL problem, an equivalent cooperative game exists, and several key components of the TSCL framework can be reinterpreted using game-theoretic principles. Through experiments covering supervised learning, reinforcement learning, and classical games, we estimate the cooperative values of experiences and use value-proportional curriculum mechanisms to construct curricula, even in cases where TSCL struggles. The framework and experimental setup we present in this work represents a novel foundation for a deeper exploration of TSCL, shedding light on its underlying mechanisms and providing insights into its broader applicability in machine learning.

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AAMAS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Scaling Opponent Shaping to High Dimensional Games

Akbir Khan
Timon Willi
Newton Kwan
Andrea Tacchetti
Chris Lu
Edward Grefenstette
Tim Rocktäschel
Jakob Foerster

In multi-agent settings with mixed incentives, methods developed for zero-sum games have been shown to lead to detrimental outcomes. To address this issue, opponent shaping (OS) methods explicitly learn to influence the learning dynamics of co-players and empirically lead to improved individual and collective outcomes. However, OS methods have only been evaluated in low-dimensional environments due to the challenges associated with estimating higher-order derivatives or scaling model-free meta-learning. Alternative methods that scale to more complex settings either converge to undesirable solutions or rely on unrealistic assumptions about the environment or co-players. In this paper, we successfully scale an OS-based approach to general-sum games with temporallyextended actions and long-time horizons for the first time. After analysing the representations of the meta-state and history used by previous algorithms, we propose a simplified version called Shaper. We show empirically that Shaper leads to improved individual and collective outcomes in a range of challenging settings from literature. We further formalize a technique previously implicit in the literature, and analyse its contribution to opponent shaping. We show empirically that this technique is helpful for the functioning of prior methods in certain environments. Lastly, we show that previous environments, such as the CoinGame, are inadequate for analysing temporally-extended general-sum interactions1.

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AAMAS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

D3C: Reducing the Price of Anarchy in Multi-Agent Learning

Ian Gemp
Kevin R. McKee
Richard Everett
Edgar Duéñez-Guzmán
Yoram Bachrach
David Balduzzi
Andrea Tacchetti

In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that quantifies the inefficiency arising in these scenarios—it compares the welfare that can be achieved through perfect coordination against that achieved by self-interested agents at a Nash equilibrium. We derive a differentiable, upper bound on a price of anarchy that agents can cheaply estimate during learning. Equipped with this estimator, agents can adjust their incentives in a way that improves the efficiency incurred at a Nash equilibrium. Agents do so by learning to mix their reward (equiv. negative loss) with that of other agents by following the gradient of our derived upper bound. We refer to this approach as D3C. In the case where agent incentives are differentiable, D3C resembles the celebrated Win-Stay, Lose-Shift strategy from behavioral game theory, thereby establishing a connection between the global goal of maximum welfare and an established agent-centric learning rule. In the non-differentiable setting, as is common in multiagent reinforcement learning, we show the upper bound can be reduced via evolutionary strategies, until a compromise is reached in a distributed fashion. We demonstrate that D3C improves outcomes for each agent and the group as a whole on several social dilemmas including a traffic network exhibiting Braess’s paradox, a prisoner’s dilemma, and several multiagent domains.

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AAMAS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Sample-based Approximation of Nash in Large Many-Player Games via Gradient Descent

Ian Gemp
Rahul Savani
Marc Lanctot
Yoram Bachrach
Thomas Anthony
Richard Everett
Andrea Tacchetti
Tom Eccles

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we propose an approach that iteratively improves an approximation to a Nash equilibrium through joint play. It accomplishes this by tracing a previously established homotopy that defines a continuum of equilibria for the game regularized with decaying levels of entropy. This continuum asymptotically approaches the limiting logit equilibrium, proven by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) to be unique in almost all games, thereby partially circumventing the well-known equilibrium selection problem of many-player games. To encourage iterates to remain near this path, we efficiently minimize average deviation incentive via stochastic gradient descent, intelligently sampling entries in the payoff tensor as needed. Monte Carlo estimates of the stochastic gradient from joint play are biased due to the appearance of a nonlinear max operator in the objective, so we introduce additional innovations to the algorithm to alleviate gradient bias. The descent process can also be viewed as repeatedly constructing and reacting to a polymatrix approximation to the game. In these ways, our proposed approach, average deviation incentive descent with adaptive sampling (ADIDAS), is most similar to three classical approaches, namely homotopy-type, Lyapunov, and iterative polymatrix solvers. The lack of local convergence guarantees for biased gradient descent prevents guaranteed convergence to Nash, however, we demonstrate through extensive experiments the ability of this approach to approximate a unique Nash equilibrium in normal-form games with as many as seven players and twenty one actions (several billion outcomes) that are orders of magnitude larger than those possible with prior algorithms. Proc. of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2022), P. Faliszewski, V. Mascardi, C. Pelachaud, M. E. Taylor (eds.), May 9–13, 2022, Online. © 2022 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www. ifaamas. org). All rights reserved.

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NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Turbocharging Solution Concepts: Solving NEs, CEs and CCEs with Neural Equilibrium Solvers

Luke Marris
Ian Gemp
Thomas Anthony
Andrea Tacchetti
Siqi Liu
Karl Tuyls

Solution concepts such as Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria are useful components for many multiagent machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, solving a normal-form game could take prohibitive or non-deterministic time to converge, and could fail. We introduce the Neural Equilibrium Solver which utilizes a special equivariant neural network architecture to approximately solve the space of all games of fixed shape, buying speed and determinism. We define a flexible equilibrium selection framework, that is capable of uniquely selecting an equilibrium that minimizes relative entropy, or maximizes welfare. The network is trained without needing to generate any supervised training data. We show remarkable zero-shot generalization to larger games. We argue that such a network is a powerful component for many possible multiagent algorithms.

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JAIR Journal 2021 Journal Article

Evaluating Strategic Structures in Multi-Agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning

Justin Fu
Andrea Tacchetti
Julien Perolat
Yoram Bachrach

A core question in multi-agent systems is understanding the motivations for an agent's actions based on their behavior. Inverse reinforcement learning provides a framework for extracting utility functions from observed agent behavior, casting the problem as finding domain parameters which induce such a behavior from rational decision makers. We show how to efficiently and scalably extend inverse reinforcement learning to multi-agent settings, by reducing the multi-agent problem to N single-agent problems while still satisfying rationality conditions such as strong rationality. However, we observe that rewards learned naively tend to lack insightful structure, which causes them to produce undesirable behavior when optimized in games with different players from those encountered during training. We further investigate conditions under which rewards or utility functions can be precisely identified, on problem domains such as normal-form and Markov games, as well as auctions, where we show we can learn reward functions that properly generalize to new settings.

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NeurIPS Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Learning to Play No-Press Diplomacy with Best Response Policy Iteration

Thomas Anthony
Tom Eccles
Andrea Tacchetti
János Kramár
Ian Gemp
Thomas Hudson
Nicolas Porcel
Marc Lanctot

Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and principled application of RL methods. However real-world settings are many-agent, and agent interactions are complex mixtures of common-interest and competitive aspects. We consider Diplomacy, a 7-player board game designed to accentuate dilemmas resulting from many-agent interactions. It also features a large combinatorial action space and simultaneous moves, which are challenging for RL algorithms. We propose a simple yet effective approximate best response operator, designed to handle large combinatorial action spaces and simultaneous moves. We also introduce a family of policy iteration methods that approximate fictitious play. With these methods, we successfully apply RL to Diplomacy: we show that our agents convincingly outperform the previous state-of-the-art, and game theoretic equilibrium analysis shows that the new process yields consistent improvements.

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NeurIPS Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Trading robust representations for sample complexity through self-supervised visual experience

Andrea Tacchetti
Stephen Voinea
Georgios Evangelopoulos

Learning in small sample regimes is among the most remarkable features of the human perceptual system. This ability is related to robustness to transformations, which is acquired through visual experience in the form of weak- or self-supervision during development. We explore the idea of allowing artificial systems to learn representations of visual stimuli through weak supervision prior to downstream supervised tasks. We introduce a novel loss function for representation learning using unlabeled image sets and video sequences, and experimentally demonstrate that these representations support one-shot learning and reduce the sample complexity of multiple recognition tasks. We establish the existence of a trade-off between the sizes of weakly supervised, automatically obtained from video sequences, and fully supervised data sets. Our results suggest that equivalence sets other than class labels, which are abundant in unlabeled visual experience, can be used for self-supervised learning of semantically relevant image embeddings.

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NeurIPS Conference 2017 Conference Paper

Visual Interaction Networks: Learning a Physics Simulator from Video

Nicholas Watters
Daniel Zoran
Theophane Weber
Peter Battaglia
Razvan Pascanu
Andrea Tacchetti

From just a glance, humans can make rich predictions about the future of a wide range of physical systems. On the other hand, modern approaches from engineering, robotics, and graphics are often restricted to narrow domains or require information about the underlying state. We introduce the Visual Interaction Network, a general-purpose model for learning the dynamics of a physical system from raw visual observations. Our model consists of a perceptual front-end based on convolutional neural networks and a dynamics predictor based on interaction networks. Through joint training, the perceptual front-end learns to parse a dynamic visual scene into a set of factored latent object representations. The dynamics predictor learns to roll these states forward in time by computing their interactions, producing a predicted physical trajectory of arbitrary length. We found that from just six input video frames the Visual Interaction Network can generate accurate future trajectories of hundreds of time steps on a wide range of physical systems. Our model can also be applied to scenes with invisible objects, inferring their future states from their effects on the visible objects, and can implicitly infer the unknown mass of objects. This work opens new opportunities for model-based decision-making and planning from raw sensory observations in complex physical environments.

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TCS Journal 2016 Journal Article

Unsupervised learning of invariant representations

Fabio Anselmi
Joel Z. Leibo
Lorenzo Rosasco
Jim Mutch
Andrea Tacchetti
Tomaso Poggio

The present phase of Machine Learning is characterized by supervised learning algorithms relying on large sets of labeled examples ( n → ∞ ). The next phase is likely to focus on algorithms capable of learning from very few labeled examples ( n → 1 ), like humans seem able to do. We propose an approach to this problem and describe the underlying theory, based on the unsupervised, automatic learning of a “good” representation for supervised learning, characterized by small sample complexity. We consider the case of visual object recognition, though the theory also applies to other domains like speech. The starting point is the conjecture, proved in specific cases, that image representations which are invariant to translation, scaling and other transformations can considerably reduce the sample complexity of learning. We prove that an invariant and selective signature can be computed for each image or image patch: the invariance can be exact in the case of group transformations and approximate under non-group transformations. A module performing filtering and pooling, like the simple and complex cells described by Hubel and Wiesel, can compute such signature. The theory offers novel unsupervised learning algorithms for “deep” architectures for image and speech recognition. We conjecture that the main computational goal of the ventral stream of visual cortex is to provide a hierarchical representation of new objects/images which is invariant to transformations, stable, and selective for recognition—and show how this representation may be continuously learned in an unsupervised way during development and visual experience.

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JMLR Journal 2013 Journal Article

GURLS: A Least Squares Library for Supervised Learning

Andrea Tacchetti
Pavan K. Mallapragada
Matteo Santoro
Lorenzo Rosasco

We present GURLS, a least squares, modular, easy-to-extend software library for efficient supervised learning. GURLS is targeted to machine learning practitioners, as well as non- specialists. It offers a number state-of-the-art training strategies for medium and large-scale learning, and routines for efficient model selection. The library is particularly well suited for multi-output problems (multi-category/multi-label). GURLS is currently available in two independent implementations: Matlab and C++. It takes advantage of the favorable properties of regularized least squares algorithm to exploit advanced tools in linear algebra. Routines to handle computations with very large matrices by means of memory-mapped storage and distributed task execution are available. The package is distributed under the BSD license and is available for download at https://github.com/LCSL/GURLS. [abs] [ pdf ][ bib ] [ code ] &copy JMLR 2013. ( edit, beta )

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