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Alexander Bochman

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20 papers
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FLAP Journal 2025 Journal Article

Causation and Argumentation

  • Alexander Bochman
  • Federico Cerutti
  • Tjitze Rienstra

Causality is a feature in a socio-economical context rapidly moving towards an ethical use of robust artificial intelligence. The primary link between cau- sation and argumentation, especially in AI, stems from the fundamental role of causality in explanations, as argued in several works in the explainable arti- ficial intelligence literature. In this sense, theories of causation naturally sug- gest themselves as an essential component of explainable artificial intelligence. Causality also directly supports what-if and counterfactual reasoning, funda- mental components for fair, robust, and resilient use of artificial intelligence tools and systems. Because of its connection with the enquiry, persuasion, and negotiation monologues and dialogues, this article popularizes the fundamental concepts of causality for the computational argumentation research community. It also accounts for the approaches to address research questions at the heart of both argumentation and causality communities, including the connections between causal models and formal argumentation approaches.

LORI Conference 2023 Conference Paper

An Inferential Theory of Causal Reasoning

  • Alexander Bochman

Abstract We present a general formalism of causal reasoning that encompasses both Pearl’s approach to causality and a number of key systems of nonmonotonic reasoning in artificial intelligence.

KR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Default Logic as a Species of Causal Reasoning

  • Alexander Bochman

We will show that Reiter's default logic can be viewed as a particular instantiation of causal reasoning. This will be demonstrated by establishing back and forth translations between default theories and causal theories of the causal calculus under a particular nonmonotonic semantics of causal theories that will be called a default semantics. Moreover, it will be shown that Pearl's structural equation models can be viewed as default causal theories in this sense. We will discuss also some global consequences this representation could have for establishing a general role of causation in nonmonotonic reasoning.

IJCAI Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Actual Causality in a Logical Setting

  • Alexander Bochman

We provide a definition of actual causation in the logical framework of the causal calculus, which is based on a causal version of the well-known NESS (or INUS) condition. We compare our definition with other, mainly counterfactual, approaches on standard examples. On the way, we explore general capabilities of the logical representation for structural equation models of causation and beyond.

KR Conference 2018 Conference Paper

On Laws and Counterfactuals in Causal Reasoning

  • Alexander Bochman

We explore the relationships between causal rules and counterfactuals, as well as their relative representation capabilities, in the logical framework of the causal calculus. It will be shown that, though counterfactuals are readily definable on the basis of causal rules, the reverse reduction is achievable only up to a certain logical threshold (basic equivalence). As a result, we will argue that counterfactuals cannot distinguish causal theories that justify different claims of actual causation, which could be seen as the main source of the problem of ‘structural equivalents’ in counterfactual approaches to causation. This will lead us to a general conclusion about the primary role of causal rules in representing causation.

FLAP Journal 2017 Journal Article

Argumentation, Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Logic.

  • Alexander Bochman

In this study, we will explore the respective roles of logic and nonmonotonic reasoning in argumentation. As a first step, we introduce the notion of collective argumentation as a logical basis of argumentation frameworks, and provide it with a natural (four-valued) logical semantics. This will allows us, in particular, to augment the underlying language with appropriate logical connectives that will transform abstract argumentation frameworks into a reasoning system with full-fledged logical capabilities. On the way, we will show not only that argumentation and logic are important for nonmonotonic reasoning, but also the other way round, namely that the main nonmonotonic formalisms and argumentation systems constitute actually primary instantiations of Dung’s abstract argumentation in appropriately extended logical languages.

KR Conference 2016 Conference Paper

On Logics and Semantics of Indeterminate Causation

  • Alexander Bochman

We will explore the use of disjunctive causal rules for representing indeterminate causation. We provide first a logical formalization of such rules in the form of a disjunctive inference relation, and describe its logical semantics. Then we consider a nonmonotonic semantics for such rules, described in (Turner 1999). It will be shown, however, that, under this semantics, disjunctive causal rules admit a stronger logic in which these rules are reducible to ordinary, singular causal rules. This semantics also tends to give an exclusive interpretation of disjunctive causal effects, and so excludes some reasonable models in particular cases. To overcome these shortcomings, we will introduce an alternative nonmonotonic semantics for disjunctive causal rules, called a covering semantics, that permits an inclusive interpretation of indeterminate causal information. Still, it will be shown that even in this case there exists a systematic procedure, that we will call a normalization, that allows us to capture precisely the covering semantics using only singular causal rules. This normalization procedure can be viewed as a kind of nonmonotonic completion, and it generalizes established ways of representing indeterminate effects in current theories of action.

AAAI Conference 2015 Conference Paper

Pearl’s Causality in a Logical Setting

  • Alexander Bochman
  • Vladimir Lifschitz

We provide a logical representation of Pearl’s structural causal models in the framework of the causal calculus of McCain and Turner (1997) and its first-order generalization by Lifschitz. It will be shown that, under this representation, the nonmonotonic semantics of the causal calculus describes precisely the solutions of the structural equations (the causal worlds of a causal model), while the causal logic from Bochman (2004) is adequate for describing the behavior of causal models under interventions (forming submodels).

KR Conference 2014 Conference Paper

Dynamic Causal Calculus

  • Alexander Bochman

versus facts that are caused (or explained) by other facts and the rules. In this context, the corresponding causal closure assumption (see. e. g., (Reiter 2001)) can be viewed as a particular form of an old philosophical principle of universal causation, which amounts to the requirement that all facts that hold in a situation should be either caused by other occurrent facts, or else preserve their truth-values in time (due to the accompanying inertia assumption). A direct incorporation of such causal assertions into the language of the situation calculus has been proposed in (Lin 1995; 1996), and has been shown to provide a natural account of both the frame and ramification problems. Subsequently, a general formal framework for this kind of causal reasoning, called a causal calculus, has been suggested in (McCain and Turner 1997). An elaborate implementation of the above causal principles in reasoning about actions has been given in (Giunchiglia et al. 2004). The formalism of (Giunchiglia et al. 2004), however, is a multi-sorted and multi-layered representation framework. As its top layer, it employs a causal action description language C+ that provides highlevel descriptions of action domains in terms of three kinds of propositional atoms (actions, simple fluents and statically determined fluents) and three different kinds of causal laws (static laws, action dynamic laws and fluent dynamic laws). Domain descriptions in this language are then instantiated by assigning temporal stamps to propositions, and incorporating the resulting descriptions into an atemporal causal calculus of (McCain and Turner 1997). The models of the resulting causal theories are viewed then as intended models of the source, higher-level action descriptions. In this study2 we will attempt to single out and ‘streamline’ the logical framework behind the language C+. To this end, we will introduce a dynamic generalization of the original causal calculus, which will be formulated, ultimately, in terms of a single basic kind of dynamic causal rules. This dynamic calculus will provide a direct and uniform logical description for the language C+. In addition, we will describe also a logical (monotonic) system of dynamic causal inference that will constitute a concise logical framework for causal reasoning in dynamic domains. We introduce dynamic causal calculus, a nonmonotonic formalism that can be viewed as a direct logical counterpart of the action description language C+ from (Giunchiglia et al. 2004). We formulate a nonmonotonic semantics of the associated causal language, and compare this semantics with the indirect, two-stage semantics for C+, given in (Giunchiglia et al. 2004). It will be shown, in particular, that the suggested semantics allows us to alleviate syntactic distinctions between propositional atoms, maintained by C+, as well as type restrictions imposed on its causal laws. We will describe also a logical formalism of dynamic causal inference that constitutes a complete description of the logic that is adequate for this dynamic calculus.

IJCAI Conference 2013 Conference Paper

The Markov Assumption: Formalization and Impact

  • Alexander Bochman

We provide both a semantic interpretation and logical (inferential) characterization of the Markov principle that underlies the main action theories in AI. This principle will be shown to constitute a nonmonotonic assumption that justifies the actual restrictions on action descriptions in these theories, as well as constraints on allowable queries. It will be shown also that the well-known regression principle is a consequence of the Markov assumption, and it is valid also for non-deterministic domains.

KR Conference 2008 Conference Paper

Default Theory of Defeasible Entailment

  • Alexander Bochman

We suggest a new representation of defeasible entailment and specificity in the framework of default logic. The representation is based on augmenting the underlying classical language with the language of conditionals having its own (monotonic) internal logic. It is shown, in particular, that nonmonotonic inheritance reasoning can be naturally represented in this framework, and generalized to the full classical language.

AIJ Journal 2004 Journal Article

A causal approach to nonmonotonic reasoning

  • Alexander Bochman

We introduce logical formalisms of production and causal inference relations based on input/output logics of Makinson and Van der Torre [J. Philos. Logic 29 (2000) 383–408]. These inference relations will be assigned, however, both standard semantics (giving interpretation to their rules), and natural nonmonotonic semantics based on the principle of explanation closure. The resulting nonmonotonic formalisms will be shown to provide a logical representation of abductive reasoning, and a complete characterization of causal nonmonotonic reasoning from McCain and Turner [Proc. AAAI-97, Providence, RI, 1997, pp. 460–465]. The results of the study suggest production and causal inference as general nonmonotonic formalisms providing an alternative representation for a significant part of nonmonotonic reasoning.

IJCAI Conference 2003 Conference Paper

A Logic For Causal Reasoning

  • Alexander Bochman

We introduce a logical formalism of irreflexivc causal production relations that possesses both a standard monotonic semantics, and a natural nonmonotonic semantics. The formalism is shown to provide a complete characterization for the causal reasoning behind causal theories from [McCain and Turner, 1997]. It is shown also that any causal relation is reducible to its Horn sub-relation with respect to the nonmonotonic semantics. We describe also a general correspondence between causal relations and abductive systems, which shows, in effect, that causal relations allow to express abductive reasoning. The results of the study seem to suggest causal production relations as a viable general framework for nonmonotonic reasoning.

NMR Workshop 2002 Conference Paper

Collective argumentation

  • Alexander Bochman

An extension of an abstract argumentation framework, called collective argumentation, is introduced in which the attack relation is defined directly among sets of arguments. The extension turns out to be suitable, in particular, for representing semantics of disjunctive logic programs. Two special kinds of collective argumentation are considered in which the opponents can share their arguments.

NMR Workshop 2002 Conference Paper

Two representations for iterative non-prioritized change

  • Alexander Bochman

We address a general representation problem for belief change, and describe two interrelated representations for iterative nonprioritized change: a logical representation in terms of persistent epistemic states, and a constructive representation in terms of flocks of bases.

AIJ Journal 2000 Journal Article

A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change

  • Alexander Bochman

We describe an alternative interpretation of the AGM postulates for belief change (Alchourrón et al. , 1985; Gärdenfors, 1988) in a foundational framework of epistemic states suggested by Bochman (1997). Though foundational contractions constitute a new kind of belief contractions, incompatible with AGM postulates, a broad class of preferential AGM contractions is shown to be revision-equivalent to foundational contractions and can actually be produced using a modification of the contraction operation on epistemic states. It is shown also that revisions of epistemic states determine a natural class of preferential AGM revisions, and that all the AGM postulates for revision can be satisfied by imposing reasonable restrictions on underlying epistemic states. As a result, the foundational theory of epistemic states is shown to provide a unification of the main approaches to belief change on a foundationalist basis.

AIJ Journal 1999 Journal Article

A foundational theory of belief and belief change

  • Alexander Bochman

We suggest a foundational representation for the notion of belief and belief change process based on the notion of an epistemic state and its associated Scott consequence relation. We study the basic belief change operations in this framework and compare the resulting theory with related approaches.

IJCAI Conference 1999 Conference Paper

Credulous Nonmonotonic Inference

  • Alexander Bochman

We present a formal characterization and semantic representation for a number of credulous inference relations based on the notion of a, n epistemic state. It is shown, in particular, that credulous inference can be naturally represented in terms of expectations (see [Gardenfors and Makinson, 1994]). We describe also the relationships between credulous and usual skeptical nonmonotonic inference and show how they can facilitate each other.

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