Arrow Research search

Author name cluster

Alan Jern

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

4 papers
1 author row

Possible papers

4

NeurIPS Conference 2011 Conference Paper

Evaluating the inverse decision-making approach to preference learning

  • Alan Jern
  • Christopher Lucas
  • Charles Kemp

Psychologists have recently begun to develop computational accounts of how people infer others' preferences from their behavior. The inverse decision-making approach proposes that people infer preferences by inverting a generative model of decision-making. Existing data sets, however, do not provide sufficient resolution to thoroughly evaluate this approach. We introduce a new preference learning task that provides a benchmark for evaluating computational accounts and use it to compare the inverse decision-making approach to a feature-based approach, which relies on a discriminative combination of decision features. Our data support the inverse decision-making approach to preference learning. A basic principle of decision-making is that knowing people's preferences allows us to predict how they will behave: if you know your friend likes comedies and hates horror films, you can probably guess which of these options she will choose when she goes to the theater. Often, however, we do not know what other people like and we can only infer their preferences from their behavior. If you know that a different friend saw a comedy today, does that mean that he likes comedies in general? The conclusion you draw will likely depend on what else was playing and what movie choices he has made in the past. A goal for social cognition research is to develop a computational account of people's ability to infer others' preferences. One computational approach is based on inverse decision-making. This approach begins with a model of how someone's preferences lead to a decision. Then, this model is inverted to determine the most likely preferences that motivated an observed decision. An alternative approach might simply learn a functional mapping between features of an observed decision and the preferences that motivated it. For instance, in your friend's decision to see a comedy, perhaps the more movie options he turned down, the more likely it is that he has a true preference for comedies. The difference between the inverse decision-making approach and the feature-based approach maps onto the standard dichotomy between generative and discriminative models. Economists have developed an instance of the inverse decision-making approach known as the multinomial logit model [1] that has been widely used to infer consumer's preferences from their choices. This model has recently been explored as a psychological model [2, 3, 4], but there are few behavioral data sets for evaluating it as a model of how people learn others' preferences. Additionally, the data sets that do exist tend to be drawn from the developmental literature, which focuses on simple tasks that collect only one or two judgments from children [5, 6, 7]. The limitations of these data sets make it difficult to evaluate the multinomial logit model with respect to alternative accounts of preference learning like the feature-based approach. In this paper, we use data from a new experimental task that elicits a detailed set of preference judgments from a single participant in order to evaluate the predictions of several preference learning models from both the inverse decision-making and feature-based classes. Our task requires each participant to sort a large number of observed decisions on the basis of how strongly they indicate 1

NeurIPS Conference 2009 Conference Paper

Abstraction and Relational learning

  • Charles Kemp
  • Alan Jern

Many categories are better described by providing relational information than listing characteristic features. We present a hierarchical generative model that helps to explain how relational categories are learned and used. Our model learns abstract schemata that specify the relational similarities shared by members of a category, and our emphasis on abstraction departs from previous theoretical proposals that focus instead on comparison of concrete instances. Our first experiment suggests that our abstraction-based account can address some of the tasks that have previously been used to support comparison-based approaches. Our second experiment focuses on one-shot schema learning, a problem that raises challenges for comparison-based approaches but is handled naturally by our abstraction-based account.

NeurIPS Conference 2009 Conference Paper

Bayesian Belief Polarization

  • Alan Jern
  • Kai-min Chang
  • Charles Kemp

Situations in which people with opposing prior beliefs observe the same evidence and then strengthen those existing beliefs are frequently offered as evidence of human irrationality. This phenomenon, termed belief polarization, is typically assumed to be non-normative. We demonstrate, however, that a variety of cases of belief polarization are consistent with a Bayesian approach to belief revision. Simulation results indicate that belief polarization is not only possible but relatively common within the class of Bayesian models that we consider.

NeurIPS Conference 2009 Conference Paper

Individuation, Identification and Object Discovery

  • Charles Kemp
  • Alan Jern
  • Fei Xu

Humans are typically able to infer how many objects their environment contains and to recognize when the same object is encountered twice. We present a simple statistical model that helps to explain these abilities and evaluate it in three behavioral experiments. Our first experiment suggests that humans rely on prior knowledge when deciding whether an object token has been previously encountered. Our second and third experiments suggest that humans can infer how many objects they have seen and can learn about categories and their properties even when they are uncertain about which tokens are instances of the same object.

v2026.09.13