Adam Lerer

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Mastering the Game of No-Press Diplomacy via Human-Regularized Reinforcement Learning and Planning

• Anton Bakhtin
• David J. Wu 0002
• Adam Lerer
• Jonathan Gray
• Athul Paul Jacob
• Gabriele Farina
• Alexander H. Miller
• Noam Brown

No-press Diplomacy is a complex strategy game involving both cooperation and competition that has served as a benchmark for multi-agent AI research. While self-play reinforcement learning has resulted in numerous successes in purely adversarial games like chess, Go, and poker, self-play alone is insufficient for achieving optimal performance in domains involving cooperation with humans. We address this shortcoming by first introducing a planning algorithm we call DiL-piKL that regularizes a reward-maximizing policy toward a human imitation-learned policy. We prove that this is a no-regret learning algorithm under a modified utility function. We then show that DiL-piKL can be extended into a self-play reinforcement learning algorithm we call RL-DiL-piKL that provides a model of human play while simultaneously training an agent that responds well to this human model. We used RL-DiL-piKL to train an agent we name Diplodocus. In a 200-game no-press Diplomacy tournament involving 62 human participants spanning skill levels from beginner to expert, two Diplodocus agents both achieved a higher average score than all other participants who played more than two games, and ranked first and third according to an Elo ratings model.

AAAI Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Equilibrium Finding in Normal-Form Games via Greedy Regret Minimization

• Hugh Zhang
• Adam Lerer
• Noam Brown

We extend the classic regret minimization framework for approximating equilibria in normal-form games by greedily weighing iterates based on regrets observed at runtime. Theoretically, our method retains all previous convergence rate guarantees. Empirically, experiments on large randomly generated games and normal-form subgames of the AI benchmark Diplomacy show that greedy weights outperforms previous methods whenever sampling is used, sometimes by several orders of magnitude.

ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Learning inverse folding from millions of predicted structures

• Chloe Hsu
• Robert Verkuil
• Jason Liu
• Zeming Lin
• Brian Hie
• Tom Sercu
• Adam Lerer
• Alexander Rives

We consider the problem of predicting a protein sequence from its backbone atom coordinates. Machine learning approaches to this problem to date have been limited by the number of available experimentally determined protein structures. We augment training data by nearly three orders of magnitude by predicting structures for 12M protein sequences using AlphaFold2. Trained with this additional data, a sequence-to-sequence transformer with invariant geometric input processing layers achieves 51% native sequence recovery on structurally held-out backbones with 72% recovery for buried residues, an overall improvement of almost 10 percentage points over existing methods. The model generalizes to a variety of more complex tasks including design of protein complexes, partially masked structures, binding interfaces, and multiple states.

ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Modeling Strong and Human-Like Gameplay with KL-Regularized Search

• Athul Paul Jacob
• David J. Wu 0002
• Gabriele Farina
• Adam Lerer
• Hengyuan Hu
• Anton Bakhtin
• Jacob Andreas
• Noam Brown

We consider the task of accurately modeling strong human policies in multi-agent decision-making problems, given examples of human behavior. Imitation learning is effective at predicting human actions but may not match the strength of expert humans (e. g. , by sometimes committing blunders), while self-play learning and search techniques such as AlphaZero lead to strong performance but may produce policies that differ markedly from human behavior. In chess and Go, we show that regularized search algorithms that penalize KL divergence from an imitation-learned policy yield higher prediction accuracy of strong humans and better performance than imitation learning alone. We then introduce a novel regret minimization algorithm that is regularized based on the KL divergence from an imitation-learned policy, and show that using this algorithm for search in no-press Diplomacy yields a policy that matches the human prediction accuracy of imitation learning while being substantially stronger.

ICLR Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Human-Level Performance in No-Press Diplomacy via Equilibrium Search

• Jonathan Gray
• Adam Lerer
• Anton Bakhtin
• Noam Brown

Prior AI breakthroughs in complex games have focused on either the purely adversarial or purely cooperative settings. In contrast, Diplomacy is a game of shifting alliances that involves both cooperation and competition. For this reason, Diplomacy has proven to be a formidable research challenge. In this paper we describe an agent for the no-press variant of Diplomacy that combines supervised learning on human data with one-step lookahead search via regret minimization. Regret minimization techniques have been behind previous AI successes in adversarial games, most notably poker, but have not previously been shown to be successful in large-scale games involving cooperation. We show that our agent greatly exceeds the performance of past no-press Diplomacy bots, is unexploitable by expert humans, and ranks in the top 2% of human players when playing anonymous games on a popular Diplomacy website.

NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

No-Press Diplomacy from Scratch

• Anton Bakhtin
• David Wu
• Adam Lerer
• Noam Brown

Prior AI successes in complex games have largely focused on settings with at most hundreds of actions at each decision point. In contrast, Diplomacy is a game with more than 10^20 possible actions per turn. Previous attempts to address games with large branching factors, such as Diplomacy, StarCraft, and Dota, used human data to bootstrap the policy or used handcrafted reward shaping. In this paper, we describe an algorithm for action exploration and equilibrium approximation in games with combinatorial action spaces. This algorithm simultaneously performs value iteration while learning a policy proposal network. A double oracle step is used to explore additional actions to add to the policy proposals. At each state, the target state value and policy for the model training are computed via an equilibrium search procedure. Using this algorithm, we train an agent, DORA, completely from scratch for a popular two-player variant of Diplomacy and show that it achieves superhuman performance. Additionally, we extend our methods to full-scale no-press Diplomacy and for the first time train an agent from scratch with no human data. We present evidence that this agent plays a strategy that is incompatible with human-data bootstrapped agents. This presents the first strong evidence of multiple equilibria in Diplomacy and suggests that self play alone may be insufficient for achieving superhuman performance in Diplomacy.

ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Off-Belief Learning

• Hengyuan Hu
• Adam Lerer
• Brandon Cui
• Luis Pineda
• Noam Brown
• Jakob N. Foerster

The standard problem setting in Dec-POMDPs is self-play, where the goal is to find a set of policies that play optimally together. Policies learned through self-play may adopt arbitrary conventions and implicitly rely on multi-step reasoning based on fragile assumptions about other agents’ actions and thus fail when paired with humans or independently trained agents at test time. To address this, we present off-belief learning (OBL). At each timestep OBL agents follow a policy $\pi_1$ that is optimized assuming past actions were taken by a given, fixed policy ($\pi_0$), but assuming that future actions will be taken by $\pi_1$. When $\pi_0$ is uniform random, OBL converges to an optimal policy that does not rely on inferences based on other agents’ behavior (an optimal grounded policy). OBL can be iterated in a hierarchy, where the optimal policy from one level becomes the input to the next, thereby introducing multi-level cognitive reasoning in a controlled manner. Unlike existing approaches, which may converge to any equilibrium policy, OBL converges to a unique policy, making it suitable for zero-shot coordination (ZSC). OBL can be scaled to high-dimensional settings with a fictitious transition mechanism and shows strong performance in both a toy-setting and the benchmark human-AI & ZSC problem Hanabi.

ICML Conference 2020 Conference Paper

"Other-Play" for Zero-Shot Coordination

• Hengyuan Hu
• Adam Lerer
• Alex Peysakhovich
• Jakob N. Foerster

We consider the problem of zero-shot coordination - constructing AI agents that can coordinate with novel partners they have not seen before (e. g. humans). Standard Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) methods typically focus on the self-play (SP) setting where agents construct strategies by playing the game with themselves repeatedly. Unfortunately, applying SP naively to the zero-shot coordination problem can produce agents that establish highly specialized conventions that do not carry over to novel partners they have not been trained with. We introduce a novel learning algorithm called other-play (OP), that enhances self-play by looking for more robust strategies. We characterize OP theoretically as well as experimentally. We study the cooperative card game Hanabi and show that OP agents achieve higher scores when paired with independently trained agents as well as with human players than SP agents.

NeurIPS Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning and Search for Imperfect-Information Games

• Noam Brown
• Anton Bakhtin
• Adam Lerer
• Qucheng Gong

The combination of deep reinforcement learning and search at both training and test time is a powerful paradigm that has led to a number of successes in single-agent settings and perfect-information games, best exemplified by AlphaZero. However, prior algorithms of this form cannot cope with imperfect-information games. This paper presents ReBeL, a general framework for self-play reinforcement learning and search that provably converges to a Nash equilibrium in any two-player zero-sum game. In the simpler setting of perfect-information games, ReBeL reduces to an algorithm similar to AlphaZero. Results in two different imperfect-information games show ReBeL converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium. We also show ReBeL achieves superhuman performance in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker, while using far less domain knowledge than any prior poker AI.

AAAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Improving Policies via Search in Cooperative Partially Observable Games

• Adam Lerer
• Hengyuan Hu
• Jakob Foerster
• Noam Brown

Recent superhuman results in games have largely been achieved in a variety of zero-sum settings, such as Go and Poker, in which agents need to compete against others. However, just like humans, real-world AI systems have to coordinate and communicate with other agents in cooperative partially observable environments as well. These settings commonly require participants to both interpret the actions of others and to act in a way that is informative when being interpreted. Those abilities are typically summarized as theory of mind and are seen as crucial for social interactions. In this paper we propose two different search techniques that can be applied to improve an arbitrary agreed-upon policy in a cooperative partially observable game. The first one, single-agent search, effectively converts the problem into a single agent setting by making all but one of the agents play according to the agreed-upon policy. In contrast, in multi-agent search all agents carry out the same common-knowledge search procedure whenever doing so is computationally feasible, and fall back to playing according to the agreed-upon policy otherwise. We prove that these search procedures are theoretically guaranteed to at least maintain the original performance of the agreed-upon policy (up to a bounded approximation error). In the benchmark challenge problem of Hanabi, our search technique greatly improves the performance of every agent we tested and when applied to a policy trained using RL achieves a new state-of-the-art score of 24. 61 / 25 in the game, compared to a previous-best of 24. 08 / 25.

NeurIPS Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Ridge Rider: Finding Diverse Solutions by Following Eigenvectors of the Hessian

• Jack Parker-Holder
• Luke Metz
• Cinjon Resnick
• Hengyuan Hu
• Adam Lerer
• Alistair Letcher
• Alexander Peysakhovich
• Aldo Pacchiano

Over the last decade, a single algorithm has changed many facets of our lives - Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). In the era of ever decreasing loss functions, SGD and its various offspring have become the go-to optimization tool in machine learning and are a key component of the success of deep neural networks (DNNs). While SGD is guaranteed to converge to a local optimum (under loose assumptions), in some cases it may matter which local optimum is found, and this is often context-dependent. Examples frequently arise in machine learning, from shape-versus-texture-features to ensemble methods and zero-shot coordination. In these settings, there are desired solutions which SGD on standard' loss functions will not find, since it instead converges to the easy' solutions. In this paper, we present a different approach. Rather than following the gradient, which corresponds to a locally greedy direction, we instead follow the eigenvectors of the Hessian. By iteratively following and branching amongst the ridges, we effectively span the loss surface to find qualitatively different solutions. We show both theoretically and experimentally that our method, called Ridge Rider (RR), offers a promising direction for a variety of challenging problems.

ICML Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization

• Noam Brown
• Adam Lerer
• Sam Gross
• Tuomas Sandholm

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the leading algorithm for solving large imperfect-information games. It converges to an equilibrium by iteratively traversing the game tree. In order to deal with extremely large games, abstraction is typically applied before running CFR. The abstracted game is solved with tabular CFR, and its solution is mapped back to the full game. This process can be problematic because aspects of abstraction are often manual and domain specific, abstraction algorithms may miss important strategic nuances of the game, and there is a chicken-and-egg problem because determining a good abstraction requires knowledge of the equilibrium of the game. This paper introduces Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization, a form of CFR that obviates the need for abstraction by instead using deep neural networks to approximate the behavior of CFR in the full game. We show that Deep CFR is principled and achieves strong performance in large poker games. This is the first non-tabular variant of CFR to be successful in large games.

NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

PyTorch: An Imperative Style, High-Performance Deep Learning Library

• Adam Paszke
• Sam Gross
• Francisco Massa
• Adam Lerer
• James Bradbury
• Gregory Chanan
• Trevor Killeen
• Zeming Lin

Deep learning frameworks have often focused on either usability or speed, but not both. PyTorch is a machine learning library that shows that these two goals are in fact compatible: it was designed from first principles to support an imperative and Pythonic programming style that supports code as a model, makes debugging easy and is consistent with other popular scientific computing libraries, while remaining efficient and supporting hardware accelerators such as GPUs. In this paper, we detail the principles that drove the implementation of PyTorch and how they are reflected in its architecture. We emphasize that every aspect of PyTorch is a regular Python program under the full control of its user. We also explain how the careful and pragmatic implementation of the key components of its runtime enables them to work together to achieve compelling performance. We demonstrate the efficiency of individual subsystems, as well as the overall speed of PyTorch on several commonly used benchmarks.

NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Robust Multi-agent Counterfactual Prediction

• Alexander Peysakhovich
• Christian Kroer
• Adam Lerer

We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions. Existing methods (e. g. structural estimation, inverse reinforcement learning) assume that agents' behavior comes from optimizing some utility or that the system is in equilibrium. They make counterfactual predictions by using observed actions to learn the underlying utility function (a. k. a. type) and then solving for the equilibrium of the counterfactual environment. This approach imposes heavy assumptions such as the rationality of the agents being observed and a correct model of the environment and agents' utility functions. We propose a method for analyzing the sensitivity of counterfactual conclusions to violations of these assumptions, which we call robust multi-agent counterfactual prediction (RMAC). We provide a first-order method for computing RMAC bounds. We apply RMAC to classic environments in market design: auctions, school choice, and social choice.

ICML Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Composable Planning with Attributes

• Amy Zhang 0001
• Sainbayar Sukhbaatar
• Adam Lerer
• Arthur Szlam
• Rob Fergus

The tasks that an agent will need to solve often are not known during training. However, if the agent knows which properties of the environment are important then, after learning how its actions affect those properties, it may be able to use this knowledge to solve complex tasks without training specifically for them. Towards this end, we consider a setup in which an environment is augmented with a set of user defined attributes that parameterize the features of interest. We propose a method that learns a policy for transitioning between “nearby” sets of attributes, and maintains a graph of possible transitions. Given a task at test time that can be expressed in terms of a target set of attributes, and a current state, our model infers the attributes of the current state and searches over paths through attribute space to get a high level plan, and then uses its low level policy to execute the plan. We show in 3D block stacking, grid-world games, and StarCraft that our model is able to generalize to longer, more complex tasks at test time by composing simpler learned policies.

AAMAS Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Prosocial Learning Agents Solve Generalized Stag Hunts Better than Selfish Ones

• Alexander Peysakhovich
• Adam Lerer

ICML Conference 2016 Conference Paper

Learning Physical Intuition of Block Towers by Example

• Adam Lerer
• Sam Gross
• Rob Fergus

Wooden blocks are a common toy for infants, allowing them to develop motor skills and gain intuition about the physical behavior of the world. In this paper, we explore the ability of deep feed-forward models to learn such intuitive physics. Using a 3D game engine, we create small towers of wooden blocks whose stability is randomized and render them collapsing (or remaining upright). This data allows us to train large convolutional network models which can accurately predict the outcome, as well as estimating the trajectories of the blocks. The models are also able to generalize in two important ways: (i) to new physical scenarios, e. g. towers with an additional block and (ii) to images of real wooden blocks, where it obtains a performance comparable to human subjects.